Undercover and collective interviewing to detect deception by Jundi, Shyma
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Undercover and Collective Interviewing 
to Detect Deception 
 
 
Shyma Jundi 
 
September 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Portsmouth. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary 
act." 
 
George Orwell 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to examine whether undercover and collective interviewing can elicit 
cues to deceit. Undercover interviewing is when the suspect is not explicitly informed that they are 
being interviewed, and collective interviewing involves one interviewer interviewing multiple 
suspects. In Chapter 1, the thesis is introduced. Then Experiment 1 is described in which 
participants were covertly interviewed about their plans for an upcoming trip. Findings indicate 
significant verbal differences in truth tellers’ and liars’ responses. 
Experiment 2 is a lie detection study, which is carried out in order to determine whether 
these differences could be identified by lay observers. Observers were given transcripts of 
undercover interviews from Experiment 1. They could correctly determine veracity significantly 
better than chance level. 
Experiment 3 examines another short undercover interview. Participants were 
despatched on a mission to take photographs, with truth tellers aiming to promote the square to 
visitors and liars surveying the area for a place to plant a decoy device. When they finished taking 
photographs, each participant was approached by a mime artist who asked them if they had 
photographed him and if he could see the photos. Results showed that truth tellers were more likely 
than liars to admit to having photographed him, and to allow him to see the photos. When analysing 
the photos, truth tellers’ photographs were more open, appealing, included more people, and central 
than liars’ photographs. Suspicious features were more prominent in liars' photos and liars 
mentioned them more frequently.  
The collective interviewing manipulation is tested in Experiment 4a, in which suspects 
were interviewed in pairs about their recent activities. Pairs of truth tellers went to lunch in a nearby 
restaurant, whereas pairs of liars 'stole' money from a purse in an office and were asked to use the 
truth tellers' activities as an alibi. Results showed that liars looked at the interview more, and 
exhibited less gaze aversion than truth tellers. More liars than truth tellers developed a strategy prior 
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to the interview. 
In Experiment 4b, the data from Experiment 4a is analysed to assess the verbal 
behaviour of the suspects when being interviewed collectively. Truth tellers interrupted each other 
more, corrected each other more, and added more information to each other’s accounts than liars.  
Experiment 5 is a combination study involving undercover and collective interviewing. 
Participants undertook a mission in pairs, where they photographed an animal enclosure in a park. 
Truth tellers did this to collect material for a promotional flyer, whereas liars acted as animal rights 
activists. Participants were interviewed covertly and formally in pairs. Results showed that liars had 
less overlap than truth tellers when their responses in the covert interview were compared to their 
responses in the formal interview. Liars were also less likely than truth tellers to mention the 
undercover interviewer in the formal interview. 
Chapter 8 is the General Discussion. Findings are summarised, and implications, future 
research and limitations are discussed. The overall conclusion is that undercover interviewing and 
collective interviewing elicit observable cues to deceit. 
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Part I: Introduction 
Chapter 1: Introduction to Thesis 
Introduction 
Detecting lies is a skill many people would like to possess, both in everyday life and in 
forensic settings. However people in general do not tend to perform significantly over chance when 
attempting to classify truths and lies. This can prove catastrophic in forensic situations, when lives 
can depend on an official correctly determining veracity. If a guilty person is believed to be 
innocent, they may be released back into the public where they will have the opportunity to 
reoffend. Equally grave are situations in which innocent people are believed to be guilty and 
subjected to lengthy and costly court proceedings that may have severe detrimental effects on all 
areas of their life. An ideal situation would be one in which innocent suspects were correctly 
pardoned and guilty people correctly tried in 100% of cases. For this to occur, a more reliable 
method of determining veracity needs to be developed. This thesis aims to develop such methods 
and identify interviewing techniques that can successfully elicit cues to deceit. 
Suspects’ accounts are primarily delivered through interviews. Therefore eliciting cues 
to deceit may be achieved through particular interviewing techniques. Examples of these cues are 
verbal differences between truth tellers and liars, which can manifest themselves in the actual 
speech content e.g. the stories of liars ‘made less sense, and they told these stories in less engaging 
and less immediate ways’ . DePaulo et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis also found that liars sound more 
uncertain and have a higher voice pitch than truth tellers. Other cues that can be indicative of deceit 
are speech hesitations i.e. frequency of saying ‘ah’ or ‘mm’ between words, confirmations i.e. 
saying ‘yes’ or ‘yeah’ to confirm what they are saying, and hedges i.e. words such as ‘maybe’ and 
‘probably’ to make statements less forceful or assertive . To date, these verbal cues have been 
examined in formal interview styles. Whether the observed patterns persist in non-formal interviews 
or interactions with suspects has not yet been explored, and thus will be addressed in this thesis. 
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For a more thorough examination of suspect behaviour, non verbal cues can be 
inspected. Indeed non verbal cues have been found to provide cues to deceit (e.g. Vrij, 2008). For 
example eye contact is a fundamental aspect of interaction and communication and is investigated 
as a nonverbal cue to deception. Both laypeople and professional lie detectors tend to expect liars to 
exhibit gaze aversion i.e. look away from the interviewer (Vrij, 2004, 2008; Vrij, Akehurst & 
Knight, 2006). In actuality the opposite may be true; liars may want to monitor the investigator’s 
reactions in order to determine whether they appear to be being believed. Also because of the 
widely held concept that liars tend to avoid eye contact, they may believe that maintaining eye 
contact will increase their credibility. Eye contact is not only a factor in one to one encounters – it 
plays a part in the communication between members of all sizes of groups. Whether observed 
patterns of eye contact remain when groups of people are interviewed is a question that warrants 
investigation in this thesis. 
Deception has been investigated in countless research settings but an observable failsafe 
method that can perfectly determine veracity is yet to be found. Therefore this thesis has built on 
previous factors as summarised above, but also investigated settings that have not yet been explored 
in lie detection. In particular, two such overarching factors were explored in depth; collective 
interviewing and undercover interviewing. The reasoning behind these selected paradigms are 
discussed below. 
Collective Interviewing 
Deception research involving forensic interview style settings typically focuses on 
individual truth tellers and liars. However criminals do not always act individually - people often 
commit crimes with others. This is a relatively unexplored gap in the research that could highlight 
effective techniques to correctly determine veracity in groups of suspects. Indeed when examining 
group psychology, it has been suggested that ‘systems of morality spring out of social intercourse’ 
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(Sprott, 1958, p.14). Examining communication within a group of suspects could therefore 
highlight differences between groups of truth tellers and groups of liars. Indeed there are instances 
in which suspects are questioned in groups e.g. before arrest, at road border controls etc. 
 
It may be possible that deception detection is facilitated when interviewing groups of 
suspects, as the members of the group will have to rely on each other to maintain a consistent story, 
stick to any strategies formed, not contradict each other etc. Moreno (1953) observed that groups 
consist of a ‘preference structure’ i.e. an amalgamation of likes, dislikes and indifferences which 
link all of its members. When lying, groups must incorporate these complexities of the group 
interaction into what is already a cognitively demanding task. Groups of liars are therefore likely to 
have different strategies to individual liars. This pattern of different strategies has been found in 
previous research where pairs of liars have given thought to planning and discussing their fabricated 
story with each other so they “get their stories straight”. 
 
Undercover Interviewing 
Deception research typically uses formal forensic interview styles (e.g. similar to those 
conducted on suspects in police stations.  These types of interviews often rely on the anxiety of the 
interviewees in order to determine veracity. The assumption is that liars are more anxious during 
interviews than truth tellers and will therefore show stronger cues of anxiety, such as heightened 
physical arousal, increased movements, and gaze aversion. However, truth tellers may also show signs 
of anxiety when they are interviewed, possibly due to being accused of misconduct or out of fear of not 
being believed. This may negate any differences in anxiety between truth tellers and liars. As a 
consequence, interview techniques that rely on signs of anxiety may not be very effective in detecting 
deceit. 
 
A possible way to avoid relying on anxiety is to conduct interviews without the suspect 
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actually knowing they are being interviewed i.e. covert or undercover interviewing. To our knowledge, 
lie detection via undercover interviewing has not been examined to date and so may add a vital 
theoretical and applied dimension to the field. 
 
Outline of the thesis 
This thesis examines verbal and nonverbal cues to deception, in individuals and in 
groups of participants, and in formal interviewing settings as well as street interviews with 
undercover interviewers. Investigation was undertaken into how these manipulations affect truth 
tellers and liars, and the cues to deceit and honesty that they exhibited. As significant differences in 
speech and behaviour were found in the studies conducted within the thesis, a lie detection study 
was carried out where random samples of lay people were asked to try and detect the liars (see Vrij, 
2000, 2002, for reviews). This was to determine whether the interview strategies in the study was 
effective in eliciting observable cues to deceit, indicated by the investigator correctly determining 
veracity significantly over chance level (50%). 
 
General Methodology 
The majority of the data were collated through interviews. The format of these 
interviews varied from impromptu ‘street’ interviews to formal police-style interviews. Liars were 
asked to use the truth tellers’ task as an alibi across all studies. This was done so any differences in 
verbal and non verbal behaviour could realistically be attributed to veracity, rather than due to 
suspects describing different tasks. For example in one study truth tellers were actual tourists about 
to visit an island. Liars were told their task was to outline an ideal location to plant a bomb, but if 
questioned to claim that they were a tourist visiting the island. 
During interviews, a strategic-questioning approach has been found to elicit differences 
between the behaviour of liars and truth tellers. This focuses primarily on the premise that liars 
formulate strategies to prepare themselves for being interviewed. However this planning involves 
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anticipating the questions that will be asked, and so asking unanticipated questions will negate the 
merits of planning. Asking liars questions they have not anticipated elicits effective cues to deceit, 
with raters being able to judge the veracity of 80% of participants correctly. So this method was 
employed in the current research, with tactics such as spatial questions and repeated questions being 
used.  Interviewees in the past have confirmed that these forms of questions came as a surprise. 
 
To extend our examination of verbal cues to deceit, aspects of speech such as hedges, 
filler phonemes and confirmations were analysed. In addition, criteria belonging to Criteria-Based 
Content Analysis (CBCA) (Raskin & Esplin, 1991) and Reality Monitoring (RM) (Masip, Sporer, 
Garrido & Herrero, 2005) were used to analyse suspect interviews in this thesis. Non verbal cues 
(gaze aversion and ‘deliberate eye contact’) and other verbal cues such as interruptions, corrections 
and additions were coded in terms of frequency of occurrence or on Likert scales. As this is a 
subjective form of analysis, multiple raters coded the same variable and their results were compared 
using Inter Correlation Coefficients (ICCs) to ensure significant consistency. 
 
Strategies 
Strategies of truth tellers and liars when undertaking interviews are an important but under-
researched area. Current lie detection research has promoted interviewing styles that can exploit the 
different mental states of truth tellers and liars (Vrij & Granhag, 2012; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). 
To be effective in designing such interview protocols, it may benefit researchers to know more about 
these mental states. One way to gain further insight into the minds of liars and truth tellers is to ask 
them about their strategies. 
 
Throughout the thesis the following methodology was adopted: Participants were given 
pre and post interview questionnaires asking them questions such as whether they have formulated a 
strategy, what questions were anticipated or unanticipated, and how confident they are that the 
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interviewer believed them. The majority of these were in the form of a Likert scale. Qualitative data 
such as strategies discussed was cluster coded in terms of similarity, so for example strategies to 
‘improvise’ and those to ‘just react’ were given the same code. Again as this involves a degree of 
subjectivity, reliability coding was carried out by another rater and the results compared to ensure 
reliability. 
 
Timelines 
In addition to being verbally questioned, in one study participants were asked to recall 
events by writing and sketching illustrations on a timeline; a technique developed by Hope, Mullis 
and Gabbert (2013). An advantage of this is it may act as a memory aid to help ensure truth tellers 
recall information accurately, which may consequently elicit greater differences to liars who are 
largely not reporting factual occurrences. Another advantage of asking them to write and draw their 
activities is that it involves virtually no input from the interviewer and is therefore less likely to be 
affected by an interviewer’s behaviour or actions . It will relieve any social pressure that 
participants may feel compels them to try and impress the experimenter (Jobe & Herrmann, 1996). 
  
Ethics 
All proposals for research were submitted for approval to the Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee. They inspected the methodology to be used and issued favourable opinions. 
Their contact details were included on all debriefing forms which were given to subjects on 
conclusion of their participation. In addition, ‘Informed Consent Forms’ were given to participants 
to sign prior to the experiment commencing. This outlined the procedure, the fact that they were 
free to withdraw at any time, that they could obtain the findings to the study and how the data 
would be kept and used. The data will be kept for a period of at least five years, in accordance with 
the Data Protection Act 1998. Participants were all given numbers so their names are not associated 
with the data. 
 17 
The Experiments 
          The following is a summary of the design of each of the experiments. Each experiment 
adopts undercover interviewing, collective interviewing of suspects, or a combination of both to test 
the capacity of the interview format to elicit cues to deceit. 
 
Experiment 1: ‘Can I take your picture?’ Examining how truth tellers and liars respond to 
undercover interviewing 
Experiment 1 focussed on interviewing participants on the street through use of an 
undercover interviewer. Truth tellers (N = 40) were tourists in the hovercraft terminal about to visit 
the island. Liars (N = 40) were given a mission to travel to the island and were briefed to survey the 
surroundings to identify a suitable place to hide a bomb. They were told that if questioned to claim 
that they were going for a day out on the island, but were not explicitly told they would be 
interviewed whilst on the mission. 
Liars were intercepted by the interviewer whilst waiting to enter the hovercraft terminal. The 
undercover lie detection interview was conducted by an appropriately dressed confederate posing as 
a student collecting information for a Tourism research project. The interview involved questions 
about their plans on the island, the timings of travel and whether they could mark their destination 
on a blank map of the island. The interviewer asked some spatial questions as liars tend to be 
unprepared for these questions (Vrij et al., 2009). We therefore predicted that liars would be less 
accurate in indicating their destination on a map. As truth tellers are likely to be less wary with an 
undercover interview, we predicted that this would manifest itself through differences in speech 
patterns between the liars and truth tellers. 
 
Experiment 2: ‘Can you spot a liar?’ Investigating the ability of lay people to correctly 
determine veracity 
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Experiment 2 investigated whether the interviews from Experiment 1 elicited observable 
differences between truth tellers and liars. A total of 66 participants were given transcripts of 
interviews from Study 1a and asked to determine whether they were lying or telling the truth, how 
confident they were in this decision, and the reason for their decision. Each participant was given 8 
transcripts consisting of 4 liars and 4 truth tellers, the order of which was counterbalanced. 
Identifying significantly more than 50% of transcripts correctly indicates a detection ability above 
chance level, suggesting that the interviewing tactics used were able to successfully elicit 
differences between truth tellers and liars. 
 
Experiment 3: ‘I’m a photographer, not a terrorist’ The use of photography to detect 
deception 
Experiment 3 examined whether liars are less likely than truth tellers to share potentially 
incriminating information when interviewed by an undercover interviewer. Previous research 
suggests that liars distance themselves from potentially incriminating evidence opting instead for an 
‘avoid and escape’ strategy (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). 
All participants conducted ‘campaigns’ involving photographing a square near the 
university, featuring a large television screen. Truth tellers (N = 41) were told that the photographs 
would be used to create a flyer encouraging people to visit the square to view the Olympics. Liars 
(N = 39) were told the aim to identify suitable areas to place a decoy device to cause a disturbance 
whilst the Olympics were shown. 
In the square was a stooge mime artist who interacted with the participant by play 
imitation to make them feel more conspicuous. As participants were about to leave the square, the 
mime artist approached them. He asked if they had photographed him and if so if he could see the 
photograph. After they left he noted their responses. 
We made several predictions, including more truth tellers than liars would agree to let 
the mime artist see the photos. This supports the theory that liars try to disassociate themselves from 
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potentially incriminating evidence. Participants were asked about their strategies in a questionnaire. 
 
Experiment 4: ‘Who should I look at?’: Verbal and non verbal differences between truth 
tellers and liars when interviewing the suspects collectively 
Experiment 4 focussed on collective interviewing i.e. interviewing suspects in pairs. 
Truth tellers (20 pairs) were taken to a nearby shopping complex to have lunch in a restaurant. Liars 
(20 pairs) were asked to ‘steal’ £10 from a purse in an office. All participants were told that they 
were suspected of having stolen £10, and would be interviewed about their recent activities in 
which they needed to convince the interviewer that they did not steal the money. Liars were asked 
to use the alibi of having been in a restaurant for lunch. Questions were general, spatial and 
temporal, and some were designed to come as a surprise to participants. Interaction between pairs as 
well as with the interviewer was examined, both verbally and in terms of eye contact. Participants 
were given time to prepare together and were asked about their strategies in a questionnaire.  
Amongst other aspects, we predicted that when compared to truth tellers, liars would make more 
eye contact with the interviewer to assess whether they were being believed, and therefore would 
also make less eye contact with each other. 
 
Experiment 5: ‘Erm, what did I tell the other guy?’: Using undercover interviewing to 
establish evidence for a formal interview 
Experiment 5 combined undercover and collective interviewing.  Each pair was given a 
‘mission’ to complete. For truth tellers (25 pairs) this involved taking photos for a ‘Visit Victoria 
Park’ campaign, and liars (25 pairs) took photos for an animal rights campaign. Truth tellers and 
liars were given different routes to take and liars were asked to pretend that they are working on a 
‘Visit Victoria Park’ campaign if questioned. 
Pairs were not explicitly told that they would be interviewed whilst on the mission. 
They were intercepted whilst in the park by an undercover interviewer posing as a member of the 
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council who was conducting a survey on park usage. To make this more believable a stooge was 
employed, who the interviewer appeared to be questioning as the pair approached. 
When they returned to the department, all participants were told that they were 
suspected of having worked on an animal rights campaign and that they needed to convince the 
interviewer they were working on a ‘Visit Victoria Park’ campaign. Liars were told about the truth 
tellers’ mission and the routes they took and were instructed to use this as an alibi in their interview. 
Participants were all given time to prepare together and were asked about their strategies in a 
questionnaire.  They then completed a formal interview in pairs, which asked about their activities 
and the routes they had travelled on. They were also asked to mark their activities on a timeline. 
Based on theoretical principles we predict amongst other aspects that liars would be less 
forthcoming about their meeting with the undercover interviewer and would show less overlap in 
their answers in the undercover and formal interviews. 
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Part II Undercover Interviewing to Detect Deception 
 
Chapter 2: Experiment 1 ‘Can I take your Picture?’ 
 
Abstract 
There are many contexts in which investigators wish to interview suspects about their intentions 
without alerting the suspects that they are actually being interviewed. In the present experiment 
we developed and tested an ‘undercover interviewing’ technique. Liars were instructed to run a 
reconnaissance mission to a nearby island for planting a decoy device and were further 
instructed to plan an innocent cover-up story to hide their criminal intentions. On arrival at the 
hovercraft terminal an undercover agent, acting in the role of either a doctoral student or an 
amateur photographer, approached the liars and asked apparently innocuous questions about 
their forthcoming trip. Actual tourists using the hovercraft terminal served as a control group. 
The questions were designed in the knowledge that liars tend to avoid and escape, and do not 
expect spatial questions; and that truth tellers have detailed representations of intentions they are 
about to execute. In support of the hypotheses, liars were less willing to be photographed, less 
accurate in identifying the places they planned to visit, and less concrete and more uncertain 
when describing their intentions. 
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Introduction 
Investigators usually attempt to detect deceit in formal interviews, and suspects are probably 
aware that one of the aims of such interviews is to judge their veracity. This awareness may hamper lie 
detection. Most lie detection techniques used to date are anxiety based (Vrij, 2008a; Vrij, Granhag, 
Mann, & Leal, 2011). The assumption of such techniques is that liars, due to their fear of apprehension, 
are more anxious during interviews than truth tellers and will therefore display more or stronger cues 
of anxiety, such as heightened physical arousal, increased movements, and gaze aversion (Vrij, 
Granhag, & Porter, 2010; Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Leal, Forrester, & Fisher, 2011). However, truth 
tellers may also show signs of anxiety when they are interviewed, from being suspected of wrongdoing 
or out of fear of not being believed (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006). Even truth 
tellers’ speech content can be affected during formal interviews, as they may neglect to mention details 
that they would otherwise have included outside the pressurised environment of a formal interview. 
Thus, in some instances, because truth tellers may also be anxious, this may actually negate any 
differences in anxiety between truth tellers and liars. As a consequence, lie detection tools that rely on 
signs of anxiety may not be very effective.  
A possible solution is to conduct interviews without the suspect actually knowing they are 
being interviewed. We call this undercover interviewing. To our knowledge, lie detection via 
undercover interviewing has not been examined to date. Although undercover interviewing is perhaps 
not suitable for all situations, it may fit particularly well in determining the veracity of an individual’s 
intentions. At the intentions stage, no crime has yet been committed, and a formal interview may 
therefore be inappropriate. In addition, in some investigative contexts, law enforcement and security 
personnel may have good reason to extract information from a suspect without he or she actually 
being aware that they are under investigation. 
In the present experiment the participants were interviewed by an ‘undercover agent’, acting 
either as a doctoral student or an amateur photographer. He approached either tourists (truth tellers) or 
participants who were on a reconnaissance mission (liars) at a hovercraft terminal, and asked them 
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questions about their forthcoming trip to a nearby island. The requirement to maintain an undercover 
persona determines the questions that can be asked, and has several disadvantages and advantages in 
terms of lie detection. Starting with the disadvantages, interview tools that have shown to facilitate lie 
detection, such as discussing evidence (“Show me your ticket?”, e.g., Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; 
Granhag, Strömwall, & Hartwig,  2007), or imposing cognitive load on interviewees (“Please tell me 
how you went from your home to the hovercraft terminal but do that in reverse order so start from here 
and go back to your home?”, e.g., Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne, & Bull, 2008) cannot be employed 
without making the suspect suspicious about the questioner’s motives. For that reason, long and in-
depth interview protocols are not possible either.  
In terms of advantages, undercover interviewing creates the opportunity to ask questions that 
could be useful for lie detection purposes but which will not work in traditional overt interviews. For 
example, the undercover interviewer could invite suspects to engage in an apparently innocent activity 
that establishes their presence in a certain place at a certain time, such as asking whether the suspect 
would mind having a photograph taken that the interviewer could place on a website. Given that a 
plausible rationale for this request is provided (e.g. “I’ve just started a new business and I’m trying to 
build up my reputation as a photographer”) we can predict that truth tellers and liars will respond 
differently to this seemingly innocuous compliance request. Guilty people do not wish to be linked to 
their criminal activity and tend to ‘avoid and escape’ when asked about it (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). 
This tendency to avoid and escape may result in greater reluctance to be photographed (Hypothesis 1). 
Asking questions about a forthcoming trip is, in fact, asking about intentions. Lying about 
intentions has been neglected by deception researchers for a long time and research into this area has 
only recently emerged (Granhag & Knieps, in press; Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, in press; Vrij, Leal, 
Mann, & Granhag, 2011). However, much research on intentions has been conducted outside the 
deception context and that research is useful to predict differences between lying and truth telling about 
intentions (see Granhag, 2010, for a review of intention deception research). A finding that is 
particularly relevant to the present context is that an individual who is about to execute his/her 
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intention typically has a detailed mental representation of that intention (Trope & Liberman, 2003). 
This representation is more detailed than those of intentions the individual plans to execute at some 
later time (Trope & Liberman, 2003). It also differs from the mental representations of intentions that 
the person has not yet decided to execute (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Marsh, Hicks, & Bryan, 1999). 
Based on this, we predict that truth tellers will be more precise when describing their intentions (e.g., 
more references to exact timings; Hypothesis 2) and will express more certainty in what they are going 
to do than liars (i.e., fewer hedges; Hypothesis 3).  
Of course, skilled liars may prepare a cover story about what they are going to do. In the 
present experiment liars were asked to say, if questioned, that they were visiting the island as a tourist 
and hence give some thought to their fictitious planned activities whilst there. Researchers have started 
to investigate how people prepare for their alibis (Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman,  Memon, Woods, & 
Michlik, 2006; Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall,  2007; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 
2010; Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag,  2006). A popular strategy is to think of possible questions 
and prepare answers to those anticipated questions. People typically do not anticipate, and are thus 
unprepared for, spatial questions (Vrij et al., 2009). Therefore, such questions in particular should 
reveal deceit. In terms of visiting an island, it could be that liars identify which attractions they are 
supposedly going to visit (e.g., the castle) but do not check specifically where they are located. 
Therefore, liars should be less accurate than truth tellers in reporting exact locations of their alleged 
destinations on the island (Hypothesis 4).  
In addition, a good alibi requires an understanding or anticipation of what truth tellers do in the 
same circumstances. This is a skill that many liars lack and is one of the reasons why the verbal lie 
detection tool Criteria Based Content Analysis (CBCA) often shows differences between truth tellers 
and liars (Vrij, 2005, 2008a). CBCA consists of 19 criteria including unusual details, spontaneous 
corrections and admitting lack of memory. In terms of preparing an alibi for a trip to an island, people 
with the least understanding will probably think of stereotypical tourist activities, such as visiting 
tourist attractions. Of course, tourists will visit such attractions, but they probably also carry out other 
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activities, such as going out for lunch, buying a souvenir or stopping to take photographs. We therefore 
predict that liars will report fewer activities than truth tellers (Hypothesis 5), although the two groups 
may not differ from each other in terms of mentioning tourist attractions.  
We explored different undercover situations by manipulating the approach taken by the 
interviewer. In one situation the interviewer introduced himself as a doctoral student conducting 
research on tourism who was surveying travel plans for visiting the island (a well known tourist resort). 
In the other situation we examined a more covert undercover approach where the interviewer 
introduced himself as an amateur photographer who was working on his portfolio. We did not expect 
this manipulation to influence the responses of truth tellers and liars, but found it relevant to explore in 
order to examine the conditions under which passers-by would still be willing to answer questions. 
However, it meant that not all questions could be asked in the more covert condition. For example, 
while it is appropriate for a survey on tourism and travel to ask “When are you planning to come 
back?”, such a question cannot be asked by an amateur photographer without raising some suspicion. 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 90 participants took part, 37% were male and 63% were female. Their average age 
was M = 36.80 (SD = 14.1) years. No difference in gender emerged between truth tellers and liars, F(1, 
76) = .53, ns, but liars were somewhat younger (M = 33.84, SD = 13.9) than truth tellers (M = 40.24, 
SD = 13.67), F(1, 76) = 4.95, p <  .05.  Although there is no theoretical reason why age would affect 
the findings predicted in the hypotheses, we re-ran the analyses presented in the main text with age as 
covariate. The same significant findings emerged as presented in the main text. Age is therefore not 
discussed further in this article.  
Procedure 
 Liars were recruited via advertising posters and an announcement on a University website. The 
advertisements asked for volunteers to take part in a reconnaissance mission study lasting a maximum 
of 2 – 2.5 hours. It was also mentioned that participants would receive a £10 cash reward. The first 43 
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people that responded (consisting of university administrative staff, academic staff and students) acted 
as liars in the experiment. On arrival at the laboratory, the first experimenter gave participants the 
following briefing: 
“You are a member of an anti-capitalist organisation that plans to disrupt the sea transport network 
for the June 2010 Isle of Wight music festival via a bomb hoax. It is your responsibility to 
determine where would be the most effective place to leave a decoy device that will cause alarm 
and ensure that hovercraft journeys will be cancelled. Your choices are at/around the hovercraft 
terminal at Southsea (located on UK mainland), on the hovercraft itself, or at/around the hovercraft 
terminal in Ryde (located on the Isle of Wight). In order to do this you will assess all three areas to 
discover which location would have the greatest disruptive impact. If anyone questions or suspects 
you, your cover story will be that you are visiting the Isle of Wight as a tourist. You will be given a 
tourist leaflet about the Isle of Wight so that you can prepare a convincing story. You will be given 
time now to examine this leaflet and devise a cover story as to why you are visiting the Isle of 
Wight. Remember it is in your interest to comply with anyone asking questions so as not to appear 
suspicious or defensive. You will be taken by an escort to the hovercraft terminal by bus from the 
department. You will arrive at the hover terminal where the escort will leave you with a pass for the 
hover that departs approximately 35 minutes after you arrive at the hover terminal. You therefore 
will have plenty of time then to start your investigation whilst looking at the terminal. You will be 
provided with a camera and Dictaphone. Gather as much information as you can about the number 
of people around, security (people and cameras), good hiding places, and so on, taking pictures and 
verbal notes on the Dictaphone. Remember not to arouse suspicion when using these items. Your 
journey of 10 minutes on the hovercraft will enable you to report on that as a possible site, and then 
you will have at least 5-10 minutes at the Ryde terminal to make notes and take photos whilst 
waiting for the next hovercraft to bring you back to Southsea. On your return to Southsea, the escort 
will meet you again to take you back to the department to report your findings to me. I will then 
give you a debrief and pay you £10 for your information.”   
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The participant was given some time to study the tourist leaflet (that contained information 
about tourist attractions and where they were located), to prepare a cover story and to ask questions. 
S/he was also given a camera and Dictaphone and the experimenter ensured that s/he knew how to 
use them.  
 The participant was then taken by bus to the hovercraft by the escort who said she would 
wait there for them to return on the next hovercraft. Soon after arrival at the hovercraft terminal the 
participant was approached by an undercover agent who asked them some questions (see below). 
All participants answered the questions. After the questioning, the participant was approached by a 
second experimenter who addressed them by name and explained that the experiment was over. 
They were then reunited with the escort who asked them to complete a questionnaire (see below) on 
the return bus journey to the department. After completing the questionnaire, the first experimenter 
debriefed the participant and gave him/her £10 cash. 
 Truth tellers were recruited at the hovercraft terminal. The undercover agent approached all 
people he believed to be tourists visiting the Isle of Wight. If they answered all the questions (all 
tourists did in the doctoral student condition and 95% did in the amateur photographer condition), 
they were included as participants in the experiment. After the interview the second experimenter 
approached the participants and told them that they had actually just participated in an experiment. 
If consent to continue participating was obtained (all participants gave consent), they were then 
asked to fill out a questionnaire and debriefed. All participants received a goody bag for their efforts 
and consent for use of their data. 
Undercover Agent and Questions Asked. The undercover agent approached 46 participants 
(of whom 21 were liars) in the guise of a University doctoral student conducting a tourism and 
travel survey. In this condition he wore University I.D. and had questions on a clipboard. He 
approached the remaining 44 participants (of whom 22 were liars) in the guise of an amateur 
photographer. In this condition he was dressed casually with a camera around his neck and asked 
questions in a conversational style (he did not carry a clipboard in this condition). The interviews 
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were covertly audiotaped. To achieve this, the undercover agent secretly carried an audio recorder 
in his pocket, linked to a microphone disguised as in-ear headphones which were hanging around 
his neck and hence around chest level.   
 The undercover interviewer asked the participants: (i) What they were going to do on the 
Isle of Wight; (ii) How they would get from the hovercraft terminal to X (wherever the participant 
said they were going to); (iii) At what time they planned to catch the return hovercraft (only asked 
under the doctoral student cover); (iv) To point out on a map which locations they were going to 
visit (for this purpose the undercover agent showed them an unmarked/non-annotated map of the 
Isle of Wight and asked them to point out with a pen the locations they were going to visit); and (v) 
Whether they would mind having a photo taken that he could put up on his website. In case they 
gave permission, the interviewer pretended to take a picture, although no actual picture was taken. 
On average liars said more during the entire interviews (M = 95.88 words, SD = 67.48) than truth 
tellers (M = 67.15, SD = 45.32), F(1, 88) = 5.71, p < .01, d = .51), but all interviews were very short.  
Although the undercover interviewer was aware who the liars and truth tellers were, he was 
blind to the purpose of the experiment and hypotheses. We return to this issue in the Discussion.  
The Questionnaire. After the interview, the second experimenter asked participants to 
confirm their age and gender; the extent to which they felt motivated to give the undercover agent 
the information he asked for (on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from [1] not at all motivated to [7] 
very motivated); the extent to which they perceived the undercover agent as authoritative (on a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from [1] not at all to [7] very authoritative); and the extent to which they 
were familiar with the Isle of Wight (on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from [1] I’ve never been to 
the island to [7] I’ve been there loads of times). The liars were further asked whether they thought 
that the interview with the undercover interviewer was part of the experiment (on a 7-point Likert 
scale ranging from [1] not at all to [7] yes I thought they were); and whether they were surprised 
that they did not actually go to the Isle of Wight (on a 7-point Likert scale from [1] I was very 
surprised to [7] I was not at all surprised). 
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 Finally, the participants were shown all questions they had been asked during the interview 
and asked to indicate how odd they found that they had been asked each one during the interview 
(on 5-point Likert scales ranging from [1] not at all to [5] very). 
The Debriefing. In the debriefing the participants were told that the interview had been 
covertly audiotaped and permission was sought to use the audiotapes for further analyses (all 
participants gave permission to use the interviews). They were also informed that the undercover 
agent had not actually taken their picture.  
Coding 
All interviews were transcribed and coded by two raters blind to the veracity status of the 
transcripts. The raters independently coded the number of hedges (e.g., utterances such as ‘likely’, 
‘probably’, ‘I am not sure’, ‘maybe’ etc.) in participants’ responses; whether or not the participants 
mentioned a return time for the hovercraft (both an estimation ‘around 2 pm’ or an exact time ‘I’ll 
take the 6.45pm return hovercraft’ were coded as references to time or timings); whether the 
participant agreed to have his/her photograph taken; and the number of locations, tourist attractions 
(e.g., Flamingo Park’, ‘Blackgang Chine’, ‘Carisbrooke Castle’) and activities (e.g., ‘have a look 
around’, ‘walking’,  ‘having lunch’, ‘taking photos’) the participant mentioned. The inter-rater 
reliability between the two raters was high and ranged from .64 (mentioning activities) to 1.00 
(permission for photo to be taken). All disagreements were resolved in a discussion between the two 
raters and the final agreed scores are used in the analyses. For hedges, the scores were corrected for 
the number of spoken words and the mean scores presented in the text and table represent the 
number of hedges per 100 words. Finally, the accuracy of location identification was determined by 
calculating in millimetres the distance between the actual location of each site and the participant’s 
indication of where it was.  
Results 
Questionnaire 
 The majority of liars (70%) were surprised that they did not go to the Isle of Wight (score of 
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3 or lower on the 7-point Likert scale, M = 2.67, SD = 2.0), and 54% of the liars thought that the 
undercover questioning was part of the experiment (score of 5 or higher on the 7-point Likert scale, 
M = 4.53, SD = 2.5). The type of cover had no effect on this latter result, F(1, 43) = .93, ns. Also, 
whether or not the liars thought that the undercover questioning was part of the experiment did not 
affect their verbal responses during the undercover interview discussed in the hypotheses-testing 
section below (all F’s < 1.99, all p’s > .16). The distinction between liars who thought and liars who 
did not think the undercover interviewing was part of the experiment is therefore not taken into 
account in further analyses.  
 Most participants (80%) said they were motivated to give the undercover agent the 
information he asked for (score of 5 or higher on a 7-point scale, M = 5.62, SD = 1.6), and Veracity 
or Type of Cover did not have an effect on this, all F’s < 2.35, all p’s > .13. Finally, Veracity and 
Type of Cover did not affect whether participants found the interviewer authoritative (M = 3.98, SD 
= 1.9), all F’s < 1.62, all p’s > .20), and the extent to which the participants were familiar with the 
Isle of Wight (M = 3.84, SD = 2.0), all F’s < .48, all p’s > .49).  
 To examine whether the experimental manipulations had an effect on how odd the partici-
pants thought the questions were, 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Type of Cover) ANOVAs were conducted. Ve-
racity had an effect only on the return time question, F(1, 43) = 6.48, p < .05, d = .78), with liars 
finding the question more odd (M = 2.61, SD = 1.2) than truth tellers (M = 1.68, SD = 1.2). Type of 
Cover had an effect only on the question about what they are going to do on the Isle of Wight. This 
question was seen as significantly more odd in the amateur photographer condition (M = 2.39, SD = 
1.3) than in the doctoral student condition (M = 1.44, SD = .9), F(1, 86) = 17.25, p < .01, d = .87). 
None of the Veracity X Type of Cover interaction effects were significant, all F’s < 2.30, all p’s > 
.13). Of the five questions asked, only the one about taking a photo was viewed as odd. The majori-
ty of participants (55%) found that question odd (scores of 4 or 5 on the 5 point Likert scale), 
whereas the other four questions were perceived as odd only by 14% to 25% of participants.  
Hypotheses testing 
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 Seven ANOVAs were carried out utilising a Veracity X Type of Cover between-subjects 
design. Two of the Type of Cover main effects were significant. In the doctoral student condition, 
the participants uttered more hedges (M = 5.07, SD = 3.61) than in the amateur photographer 
condition (M = 3.17, SD = 3.38), F(1, 86) = 8.26, p < .01, d = .54. In addition, participants listed 
fewer events in the doctoral student condition (M = .44, SD = .62) than in the amateur photographer 
condition (M = .70, SD = .59), F(1, 86) = 4.03, p < .05, d = .43). Type of Cover main effects are not 
relevant for this article, only the Veracity main effect and Veracity X Type of Cover interaction 
effects are of direct interest. None of the interaction effects were significant (all F’s < 3.84, all 
p’s > .05) but five of the seven Veracity main effects were significant. Table 1 provides all the 
relevant information about the univariate Veracity effects.    
 The findings support all five hypotheses. Liars were less willing to be photographed (Hy-
pothesis 1), and less likely to mention return times (Hypothesis 2). In addition, they uttered more 
hedges (Hypothesis 3), were less accurate when identifying locations they planned to visit on a map 
(Hypothesis 4) and mentioned fewer activities (Hypothesis 5). No differences were found between 
liars and truth tellers in the number of tourist attractions and locations they mentioned. Regarding 
Hypothesis 4 (identifying locations on the map), in real life it may be easier just to judge the accu-
racy of the first location that is pointed out. Truth tellers (M = .26, SD = 1.60) were more accurate 
than liars (M = 18.83, SD = 43.74) in pointing out the first location, F(1, 75) = 8.60, p < .01, d = 
.82. 
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Table 1. Participants’ Responses as a Function of Veracity 
 Truth Lie F P d 
 M SD M SD    
Probability of agreeing to have 
photo taken 
.81 .40 .60 .49 4.61 <.05 .43 
N exact times mentioned .88 .34 .30 .47 22.20 < .01 1.43 
Hedges uttered per 100 words 3.10 2.74 5.27 4.09 10.20 < .01 .63 
N locations mentionedi .94 .79 .67 .64 3.21 .08 .38 
Distance (mm) between actual 
location and participant’s 
indication of its location 
2.00 7.76 19.61 43.17 7.46 < .01 .69 
N tourist sites mentioned .47 .58 .67 .64 2.28 .13 .33 
N activities mentioned .72 .90 .37 .54 5.06 < .05 .49 
 
 
Discussion 
To our knowledge, this is the first experiment discussing an undercover interviewing technique 
with the main aim of detecting deception. An undercover agent asked truth tellers (actual tourists) or 
liars (participants who were on a mission) five questions about their forthcoming trip to a local 
island/tourist destination. The questions were based on the knowledge within the wider deception 
literature that liars (i) have a tendency to avoid and escape, (ii) do not anticipate spatial questions, (iii) 
and often have poor imagination when preparing alibis; and that (iv) truth tellers have more detailed 
representations of intentions that they are about to execute. Many differences emerged between liars’ 
and truth tellers’ responses. Liars were less willing to be photographed, less accurate when pointing 
to the places they planned to visit on a map, less concrete and more uncertain when describing their 
intentions, and less likely to report activities that are not typical tourist activities (‘go for a walk’, 
‘have lunch’). What makes the results remarkable is that both truth tellers’ and liars’ answers were very 
short, on average less than 100 words were uttered in the entire interview. It thus appears that liars and 
truth tellers do not have to say much for verbal cues to deception to occur, as long as diagnostic 
questions are asked. A second remarkable aspect is that the liars were not naïve: They had prepared a 
cover-up story for their reconnaissance mission. This preparation was to some extent successful, as 
liars and truth tellers did not differ in the number of tourist attractions and locations they mentioned. 
Liars’ downfall, however, was that many of our questions went beyond their planning. 
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We used two types of undercover scenario, the undercover agent took the role of a doctoral 
student researching tourism/travel trends or an amateur photographer. This did not affect the responses 
given by the participants. A crucial element of an undercover lie detection approach is that the suspect 
is unaware of the true purpose of the questions or that he or she is being monitored. In that respect two 
findings, both unrelated to the Type of Cover we used, are encouraging. First, the truth tellers and liars 
did not find most of the questions the undercover agent asked to be odd. Second, almost half of the 
liars were not aware that the undercover interview was part of the experiment. We believe that this is an 
encouraging percentage because participants in a psychology experiment are most likely to be on the 
alert and expect such things to happen. In fact, for that reason we had expected more liars to work out 
that the undercover interview was part of the experiment. The liars who were unaware told us in the 
debriefing session that they did not suspect the interviewer because they were focussing on their 
surveillance task. (In other words, they were truly unaware, rather than not reporting suspicion due to 
demand characteristics.) Furthermore, the majority of those who did realise that the undercover 
interview was part of the experiment said that their suspicions arose because they were told at briefing 
to come up with a cover-story. This suggests that in real life, when such briefings do not take place, a 
lack of awareness may be even higher than found in the present experiment. Although awareness about 
being interviewed can be harmful in real life (it may make the suspect alert that s/he is under 
observation) it is positive that this awareness did not affect the answers liars gave, as those who were 
aware that the questioning was part of the interview gave similar responses to those who were unaware.  
An undercover agent can only be successful if the person s/he approaches is cooperative and 
willing to answer the questions. In our experiment nearly all tourists were cooperative, as were all liars. 
Since we used real tourists, the level of cooperation shown by them should reflect the level of 
cooperation that can be expected in real-life settings when using the types of cover employed in this 
experiment. However, in real life people who are on a reconnaissance mission may be less willing to 
answer questions than our liars were. Whether this is the case is a valuable question and merits 
attention in future research. Such research could draw upon the persuasion literature, which provides 
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insight into how to increase levels of cooperation and compliance during interactions between 
strangers. However, the willingness to cooperate was not the point we were investigating. We 
examined differences in responses between truth tellers and liars once they had already committed to 
cooperating with the undercover agent.  
We would like to emphasise that our sole aim was to examine whether undercover interviewing 
works in terms of lie detection. It was not our aim to compare this type of interviewing with formal, 
overt interviewing but this could be the next line of research. It would then be particularly interesting to 
compare truth tellers and liars in terms of displaying signs of anxiety. Based on what we discussed in 
the Introduction, we hypothesise that signs of anxiety are more diagnostic cues to deceit in undercover 
interviews than in formal interviews as truth tellers have less reason to be anxious in undercover 
interviews than in formal interviews. Of course, support of this hypothesis would suit law enforcement 
personnel well in their efforts to detect deception during undercover interviews as they 
overwhelmingly believe that liars display signs of anxiety (Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004).  
We conclude this chapter with three comments. The first comment relates to our decision to 
recruit real tourists as truth tellers rather than instructing participants to pretend to be tourists. The 
reason for using real tourists is that it provides insight into how tourists will respond in real life. 
Although using tourists may have drawbacks (we will discuss two), we believe that these do not 
outweigh this realism argument. The demographics of the tourists and the recruited participants in the 
lie condition may be different. In an attempt to avoid this, we did not just recruit students in the lie 
condition, but also other University personnel. Despite this, tourists were somewhat older (M = 40.24) 
than liars (M =33.84). A difference in demographics between conditions becomes relevant if a 
theoretical explanation could be given as to why it should affect the participants’ responses to the 
questions asked in the interview (e.g., why should age affect the responses?). We cannot think of any 
such explanation. Therefore, unsurprisingly, controlling for age differences did not affect the findings 
presented in the Results section. In addition, the undercover agent knew which participants were telling 
the truth and which were lying. We are aware that an interviewer’s knowledge could affect participants’ 
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responses (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977). However, the undercover interviewer was blind to the 
hypotheses and unaware of deception research. In other words, his knowledge was restricted and in our 
opinion too limited to yield an effect on the participants’ responses. 
The second comment is related to the choice of liars. We acknowledge that the people who 
make reconnaissance missions in real life may differ from the people who acted as liars in our 
experiment. They may be better skilled in carrying out reconnaissance activities such as finding 
suitable locations where to install bombs than our liars, but that was not the topic of our investigation. 
In terms of the ecological validity of the present experiment, the relevant question is whether they 
would give different responses in undercover interviews than our liars. We cannot think of a 
convincing theoretical explanation why they would.  
Our final comment is related to whether undercover interviews are or will be carried out. We 
neither know this nor will discover it, due to the secretive nature of such interviews. However, not 
much imagination is needed to think of relevant investigative settings for such interviews.   
                                                 
i The number of locations appear somewhat low as many people mentioned an event without men-
tioning its location (e.g., Flamingo Park’).  
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Chapter 3: Experiment 2 ‘Can you spot a liar?’ 
Abstract 
Interviewing techniques in forensic settings are often deployed with a primary aim being to 
determine whether the interviewer is giving an honest or deceptive account. In order for the 
techniques to be effective, the cues to deceit that they elicit must be apparent to the interviewer or 
observers. This study investigated whether cues to deceit elicited by an undercover interviewing 
technique were apparent to lay observers with no formal lie detection training. Results showed that 
when viewing the transcripts observers could correctly determine veracity at a rate significantly 
over chance, with a truth bias present. 
Introduction 
Law enforcement officers are regularly required to assess whether someone is lying or telling the 
truth. Veracity judgements can be made several times in relation to the same suspect, from the point 
when a police officer decides to arrest them or not, to when an investigating officer interviews them, 
to when a judge and jury hear their testimony in court. If misjudged, consequences could be 
catastrophic, such as terrorists smuggling in explosive devices if they fool border control officials. 
In instances such as these, determining the suspects’ intentions regarding future events is crucial. 
Their answers could either be truthful (indicating true intent) or deceptive (indicating false intent). 
A great deal of deception research focuses on identifying whether people are truthful about past 
actions. This study therefore focussed on identifying deceptive statements about intentions. 
 
Although an integral part of their job, the evidence from laboratory studies suggests that most 
professional lie catchers are not much better than laypeople at distinguishing truths from lies (e.g. 
(e.g., DePaulo & Pﬁefer, 1986, Garrido & Mausip, 1999). Devising a paradigm of interviewing that 
increases the accuracy with which people can identify lies is therefore highly desirable for legal 
settings. Indeed if laypeople can successfully identify deceit in the interviews, professional law 
enforcement officers should effectively catch the liars too. 
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The study ‘Can I take your picture?’ (Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hope & Leal, 2012) endeavoured to devise 
an interviewing technique of this nature that effectively elicits differences between truth tellers and 
liars. To assess whether this was successful, transcripts from the study were used to conduct a lie 
detection study. Participants were given transcripts and asked to judge whether the interview they 
read was that of a truthful or deceptive interviewee. 
Given that judgements are based solely on the transcript, evaluators must rely on verbal cues to 
make their decisions.  Several verbal lie detection tools have been designed to aid criminal 
investigators to distinguish between truths and lies. Two of these, Statement Validity Assessment 
(SVA) and Reality Monitoring (RM), are the most widely researched (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & 
Herrero, 2005; Vrij, 2005, 2008). The core of SVA is Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA), a 
list of 19 criteria that are thought to occur more often in truthful than in deceptive accounts 
(Köhnken & Steller, 1988; Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Undeutsch, 1984). 
 
The RM and CBCA tools can distinguish truths from lies with about 70% accuracy (Vrij, 2008). A 
disadvantage of these methods is that people need to be trained to use them. In an ideal situation, 
investigators will not require training to identify deception. If a paradigm can be identified that 
successfully elicits differences between truth tellers and liars to an extent whereby untrained 
individuals can correctly determine veracity, the rate at which the veracity of suspects can be 
successfully delineated will in theory rise dramatically. 
 
To test whether untrained investigators can detect deceit about intentions in undercover interviews, 
participants in this lie detection study were not told which cues to look for. From the Vrij et al. 
(2012) study, results showed liars were less willing to be photographed, less accurate in identifying 
the places they planned to visit, and less concrete and more uncertain when describing their 
intentions. The advantage of these results is that they pertain to behaviours that could in theory be 
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noticed by casual observers. Previous research (e.g. Vrij, Leal, Mann & Granhag, 2011) has 
demonstrated paradigms through which lay observers can accurately determine veracity, without the 
need for formal intensive training. We argue that the liars’ speech in the Vrij et al. (2012) study can 
be correctly classified as deceptive without the need for any training, and this will be tested in the 
current study. 
We therefore hypothesise that when reading a transcript, participants will be able to correctly 
identify whether it is from a truthful or deceptive interviewee at a rate significantly above chance 
level.  
Method 
A total of 66 participants, 51 of whom were female, were recruited. The mean age was 29.00 (SD = 
13.96) years. Participants were given transcripts of undercover interviews conducted in the ‘Can I 
take your picture’ study. Each participant was given eight randomly selected transcripts (consisting 
of four from truthful interviewees and four from lying interviewees) and were entirely blind as to 
the veracity of the transcripts. In total, 93 different transcripts were used (49 of which were from 
truthful interviewees and 44 of which were from deceptive interviewees) and each transcript was 
viewed by more than one participant (an average of 5.68 participants per transcript), and the order 
in which the transcripts were presented was counterbalanced. 
Participants were provided with the following information: 
‘In a study participants (both truth tellers and liars) were interviewed about their travel plans. 
Truth tellers were tourists about to visit the Isle of Wight by hovercraft. They were approached by 
the interviewer who informed them he was studying a degree in Tourism.  This interviewer then 
asked them a number of questions about their travel plans. 
Liars were told that they would also be visiting the Isle of Wight, but that the purpose of their trip 
was to collect information for a future terrorist plot. They were briefed to prepare a cover story of 
being a tourist visiting the island in the event of being questioned by anyone. They were approached 
and questioned in the same way as truth tellers. 
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You are about to read transcripts of the interviews. After reading each transcript we would like you 
to indicate whether the person really was a tourist about to visit the island (truth tellers) or was 
pretending to be a tourist (liars).’ 
Participants were then asked to rate to what extent they were motivated to perform well on the task 
on a scale of 1 (not at all motivated) to 5 (very motivated) and were then given the eight transcripts. 
They judged whether these transcripts were truthful or deceptive.  After they had completed this 
their results were analysed and the percentage of correctly judged transcripts for truthful and 
deceptive interviewees was calculated. 
Results 
Manipulation check 
Participants had an average motivation score of M = 3.98 (SD = 0.79) on the 5-point motivation 
scale which means that they were highly motivated to appear convincing.  
 Hypothesis testing 
Participants correctly identified truthful interviewees at a rate of 64.02% (SD = 24.07), which is 
over chance; t(65) = 21.60, p < 0.001.  Deceptive interviewees were correctly identified at a rate of 
56.82% (SD = 25.40) which is also above chance; t(65) = 18.17, p < 0.001; determined by a 
binomial test compared to 50% accuracy. There is a significant difference between the percentage 
rate at which truthful and deceptive interviewees were identified; t(65) = 21.60, p < 0.001.  
In other words, participants classified truthful responses as truthful at a rate of 64.02%, and 
deceptive responses as truthful at a rate of 43.18%. So overall they rated 53.60% of all responses as 
truthful, which differs significantly from chance; t(65) = 2.170, p = 0.034). 
 
Discussion 
The accuracy rates obtained were higher than typically found in deception research (55%, see Bond 
& DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008).  There are two possible reasons for this. It could be that detecting 
true and false intent is easier than detecting truthful and deceptive recall of past activities, as has 
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been found in previous research (Vrij, Leal, Mann & Granhag, 2011). Alternatively or indeed 
potentially additionally, the covert interviewing paradigm used to interview suspects may manifest 
clearer differences between truth tellers and liars than the formal, forensic style interviews typically 
employed. With these covert interviews, suspects were not primed to expect them. Indeed 46% of 
the liars did not realise that the interview was part of the experiment. This could mean that the 
suspects were not as well prepared for the interview as they would be for an expected, formal 
forensic interview, and people are typically better liars if they have had the opportunity to prepare 
(DePaulo et al., 2003, Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007; Vrij, 2008). 
Furthermore, as interviewees were not aware it was an interview, they may not have tried as hard to 
convince the interviewer that they were telling the truth. So the preparation that liars had done may 
not have actually been executed, as they were unaware that the apparent BA Tourism student was 
actually making a judgement of their veracity.  
Lying about intentions may also be more difficult than lying about the past, resulting in suspects 
being less convincing during their intentions interview. This complements the theory of Episodic 
Future Thought (EFT), which represents the ability to mentally pre-experience a one-time personal 
event that may occur in the future (Schacter & Addis, 2007). People with a plan for a future event 
that they intend to execute appear to activate a more detailed mental image of the upcoming 
occurrence than do those who adopt a plan that they do not intend to execute (Watanabe, 2005). 
This could therefore lead to liars struggling more to describe their image during an interview than 
truth tellers. 
  
 Although participants could determine veracity of both truth tellers and liars significantly above 
chance, they were more successful at correctly identifying truth tellers. Meissner & Kassin (2002) 
found an effect on response bias such that training and prior experience appeared to increase the 
likelihood of responding “deceit” as opposed to “truth.” However as our participants were all lay 
people who were untrained and inexperienced in deception detection, they did not have this 
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predisposition to respond with ‘deceit’ more so than ‘truth’, and were in fact significantly more 
likely to rate a response as truthful rather than deceptive. This is supported by previous lie detection 
studies which have found a ‘truth bias’ factor (Vrij & Baxter, 1999); where participants are more 
inclined to believe the interviewees and so judge more of them as being truthful.  
 
This experiment tested the efficiency of covert interviewing of individual suspects in eliciting cues 
to false intent. However there are instances in which there may be only one interviewer but more 
than one suspect present. This is particular true in street interviews, as suspects may not be acting 
alone. In these situations covert interviewing could be used to approach suspects collectively in an 
effort to determine their intentions. Future research could involve a paradigm in which pairs of 
truthful and deceptive suspects are collectively interviewed covertly, and then transcripts of the 
interviews given to lay observers to assess whether veracity can be correctly ascertained. 
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Chapter 4: Experiment 3 ‘I’m a Photographer, not a Terrorist’ 
Abstract 
The instance of police asking tourists to delete their photos as a precautionary counter-terrorist 
measure has attracted significant media attention. When planning large scale incidents or bombing 
campaigns, terrorists often conduct reconnaissance research to identify key targets.  This may 
include taking photographs of potential target locations. Identifying an effective real-time method to 
distinguish between genuine photographers and those with more sinister intent may be beneficial 
for law enforcement and security agencies. Participants took photographs of their surroundings with 
genuine intent (truth tellers) or sinister intent (liars). After taking these photographs, the participants 
were approached by an undercover interviewer (a mime artist) who asked them whether he could 
see the photographs. Later, the participants discussed their photographs in a formal interview. Liars 
were less cooperative in their interaction with the undercover interviewer than truth tellers. In the 
formal interview, as the result of an ironic monitoring process, liars mentioned some security 
features that appeared in the photographs more than truth tellers. The findings suggest that 
photography and deception is a subject that could prove important to explore to benefit forensic and 
counter-terrorist practice. 
 
Introduction 
Terrorists carry out surveillance missions (Soufan, 2011) but it is unknown how often they 
use photography during those missions. The instance of police asking tourists in London to delete 
their photos as a precautionary counter-terrorist measure attracted significant media attention 
(Weaver & Dodd, 2009). Internet accounts suggest that this was not an isolated incident, with an 
online movement being formed to campaign for photographers’ rights entitled ‘I’m a Photographer, 
not a Terrorist!’. The issue is a global one, with a controversial terrorism prevention video being 
released in the USA asking the public to report photographers to the police (Terrorism Prevention 
Video asks Public to Report Photographers to Police, 2012). 
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Identifying an effective on-site method to distinguish between genuine photographers 
and those with more sinister intent could have multiple benefits. It could give innocent 
photographers a more secure platform to engage in legitimate activity without fear of being wrongly 
accused of criminal intent. Perhaps more importantly, it could provide law enforcement officers 
with the knowledge of how to approach photographers in a manner in which they could reliably 
determine whether the person could be involved in criminal activity. There are two main ways in 
which potential criminal intent could be initially gauged in this context: (i) how the photographer 
reacts to questioning, and (ii) the nature/content of the photographs themselves. We examined both 
features in the present experiment.  
Being openly questioned by the police about the purpose of the photos could have 
disadvantages for both innocent people and potential criminals. It could induce panic or stress, but 
also, anger and resistance in innocent people (as discussions to date illustrate e.g. Weaver & Dodd, 
2009; Laurent, 2009). It could make potential terrorists aware that they have been noticed, which 
could jeopardise an investigation into their network and activities. A potential way to avoid these 
disadvantages is to use undercover interviewers to approach the photographers, i.e. people who 
appear to be everyday civilians rather than law enforcement officers.  
Undercover interviewing may fit particularly well in determining the veracity of an 
individual’s intentions. At the intentions stage, no crime has yet been committed, and a formal 
interview may therefore be inappropriate. Indeed, there is evidence to show that undercover 
interviewing can elicit differences in responses between truth tellers and liars (Vrij, Mann, Jundi, 
Hope, & Leal, 2012). 
The current study investigates undercover interviewing of photographers who are 
potentially involved in simulated terrorist activity. In the experiment, truth tellers took photographs 
to promote a city tourist location. Liars took photographs in order to plan planting a decoy device in 
the same tourist location and, as an alibi, photographs to promote the tourist location. The liars’ 
mission included taking photographs of security features such as possible places to plant a decoy 
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device (bins, toilets, drains and manholes) and to check for security in the area and vantage points 
that they could be overlooked from (CCTV cameras, windows, rooftops). When the participants left 
the area after completing their mission they were approached in a non-threatening manner by a 
confederate posing as a street entertainer (a mime artist), who questioned them about their 
photographs. Later, participants had a formal interview about a selection of the photographs they 
took.  
The introduction of the mime artist is a key manipulation in the study, designed to put liars 
in a situation that would make them feel more on the spot or conspicuous. The mime artist asked 
photographers if they have photographed him, and whether he could see the photos. Mentioning that 
they have taken photos of the mime artist will in all likelihood result in a conversation with the 
mime artist and liars may be reluctant to engage in such a conversation. They may wish to avoid 
possible questions the mime artist will ask or they may simply not be in a chatty and cooperative 
mood. Liars often experience more negative affect than truth tellers and this could make them more 
reluctant to engage in conversations (DePaulo et al., 2003; Mann, Vrij, Shaw, Leal, Ewens, Hillman, 
& Granhag, 2012; Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hope, & Leal, 2012). The same reasons may also make liars 
reluctant to show photographs if asked. They may also engage in an 'avoid and escape' strategy 
where they distance themselves from anything or anyone they deem to be potentially incriminating 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). In this case, it is a witness who may give evidence against them. We 
therefore predicted that liars would be less likely to report that they have photographed the mime 
artist (Hypothesis 1a) and more likely to refuse to show the mime artist their photographs than truth 
tellers (Hypothesis 1b). 
During the interview, truth tellers and liars were shown a selection of the photographs they 
took. For liars, these were photographs of their ‘terrorist mission’ and photos of the ‘promoting the 
tourist location’ mission. For truth tellers these were only photographs aimed at promoting the 
square as a tourist destination. Truth tellers and liars were asked to describe what they could see on 
each of their photographs. Of particular interest is a possible difference between liars and truth 
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tellers in discussing their ‘promoting the square’ photographs. Given their terrorist mission, liars are 
likely to have security features in the forefront of their mind when observing and discussing their 
promotional photographs. According to visual attention models, people automatically guide their 
eyes to regions of interest especially those at the forefront of their thoughts (Oliva & Torralba, 
2007). In other words, in all likelihood liars will think about the security features when discussing 
their promotional features, will notice them in their photographs and therefore may mention them 
more in interview. Liars’ avoidance of mentioning security features in the mission photographs may 
trigger an ironic monitoring process when discussing the promotional photographs, resulting in 
them over compensating and reporting more security features than truth tellers (Hypothesis 2). The 
Ironic Process Theory (Wegner, 1997) proposes that the most and the least desired effects of 
attempts to control one’s mental state stem from two processes, one of which is the ‘ironic 
monitoring process’. Wegner argues that ‘the monitor's effects on mind can supersede those of the 
operator, producing the very state of mind that is least desired’ (p.148). (See also Selective Attention, 
Cohen, 2006). In the experiment we distinguished between security features that liars might 
consider a risk to mention  (bins, toilets, drains, man holes and CCTV cameras) and more 
innocuous security features (windows and roof tops). We believe that Hypothesis 2 will particularly 
hold true for the more innocuous security features as liars will believe that mentioning them will not 
be harmful to them. 
Apart from comparing truth tellers’ and liars’ promotional photographs, we also 
compared liars’ mission and promotional photographs. Liars’ mission photographs will be for the 
purpose of identifying security features, and their promotional photographs will be to show the area 
at its best in order to attract people. Perhaps as a result, these mission photographs will be less 
visually appealing than the promotional photographs (Hypothesis 3).  
Method 
Participants 
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 A total of 80 participants were recruited, 52 of whom were female. The mean age was 22.55 
(SD = 6.59). Participants were randomly allocated to the truth (N = 41) or lie condition (N = 39).  
Procedure 
 Participants arrived at the Psychology Department for briefing with the experimenter. Truth 
tellers and liars had about 20 minutes to complete the task individually at Guildhall Square, which 
is a pedestrianised area featuring the Guildhall (a building historically used as the meeting place of 
a guild or corporation), civic offices and a large video screen.  
 Truth tellers were told that their mission was to promote being an audience member for 
watching the 2012 Olympics on the large video screen in Guildhall Square. They were given a 
camera on which to take photographs for a flyer to promote Guildhall Square as a good place to 
watch the Olympics. They were told to show the Guildhall and civic offices at their best so as to 
attract tourists, and were asked to report back to the researcher in 20 minutes to select the 
photographs that they thought were best for the flyer. 
 Liars were told that they were on a reconnaissance mission for planting a decoy device to 
disrupt the showing of the Olympics on the Guildhall Square screen. They were informed that they 
would need to decide where would be the best place to plant a device, and also to check for security 
within that area. Liars were also provided with a camera and asked to photograph all vantage points 
that they could be overlooked from, i.e. from which cameras or office windows or roof tops. They 
also were told to photograph potential device site points including underground locations such as 
manhole covers or drains.  Liars were instructed to remain unnoticed and to avoid alerting anyone 
to what they were photographing. If asked, they were to use the truth tellers’ mission as their cover 
story, i.e. to state that they were taking promotional photographs of Guildhall Square for a flyer to 
attract tourists to watch the Olympics on the screen. Liars were advised to take photographs 
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appropriate for this reason also. They were then asked to return to the researcher in 20 minutes to 
show their photos and discuss their findings in the same manner as truth tellers.  
 On entering the square, some participants (25 truth tellers and 25 liars) encountered a mime 
artist whose act involved comically impersonating people as they passed through the square. As 
consent to interact with the mime artist could not practically be sought from the general public, four 
stooges were employed to be in the square for the mime artist to interact with when the participant 
arrived. 
 Apart from impersonating the stooges, the mime artist was also instructed to interact with 
the participant. The experimenter texted the mime artist and the stooges a description of the 
participant before they arrived at the square so they were easily identifiable. As the participant 
returned to the researcher after completing the photograph taking exercise, the mime artist was 
situated en route. He approached the participant and asked if they had photographed him. If they 
answered ‘yes’ he asked if he could see the photograph, and if they said ‘no’ or that they weren’t 
sure, he asked if he could check as he thought he was in the background when the participant was 
taking photographs. The mime artist maintained a friendly and non-accusatory attitude throughout. 
We selected the role of a mime artist as they are not directly associated with law enforcement, and 
we reasoned that being approached by a street entertainer would be plausible to participants and 
unlikely to raise doubts as to the questioner’s integrity. 
 On their return to the department, all participants were told that there had been reports of 
people planning to plant a decoy device in Guildhall Square and that they were suspected of having 
being involved with this. They were told that they would be interviewed about their claim that they 
were working on a project to promote being an audience member for watching the 2012 Olympics 
in Guildhall Square. 
 The participants’ photographs were then downloaded onto a laptop. There was no difference 
in the total number of photographs taken between truth tellers (M = 17.09, SD = 9.47) and liars (M 
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= 18.41, SD = 11.46), F(1,78) = 0.30, p = 0.58, d = 0.13. Truth tellers were asked to select the six 
photographs they deemed best to use for the promotional flyer. Liars were asked to select three 
photographs that they felt best suited their mission i.e. illustrating the vantage points and security 
precautions in place in Guildhall Square. They were also asked to select three photographs that they 
preferred for their cover story i.e. promoting Guildhall Square for the Olympics.  
 To motivate all participants to be convincing during the interview, participants were told 
that if the interviewer believed they were working on a project to promote Guildhall Square that 
they would receive £10, and if they were not believed that they would not receive the money but 
instead would be asked to write a statement explaining their whereabouts. In reality all participants 
received the money and none were asked to write a statement. 
 The interviewer was blind to the participant’s veracity condition, and was given the 
photographs that had been selected by the participants. The interviewer showed the participant each 
of the six photographs one by one, and for each photograph asked them to: ‘Please describe in as 
much detail as possible what you can see in the photograph.’ In other words, the interview consisted 
of a single question that was asked six times. 
 After the interview, the participant was asked to complete a post interview questionnaire. 
This included the questions ‘What do you think the likelihood is of you getting the £10?’ and ‘What 
do you think the likelihood is of you writing a statement?’ which was rated on a scale of 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (totally). They were also asked whether the interview required a lot of thinking (cognitive 
effort) and whether it was mentally difficult, on a scale of 1 (certainly not) to 7 (certainly). 
Participants were all asked to rate how motivated they were to appear convincing during the 
interview, from 1 (definitely not) to 7 (definitely). 
Coding 
Photographs Taken By the Participants.  A rater reported whether the mime artist was 
present in any of the photographs. When he was present a score of ‘1’ was given (regardless of how 
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many photographs he appeared in), and if he did not occur in any of the photographs a score of ‘0’ 
was given. 
Interview Coding. Due to a combination of technical and logistical issues only 52 
interviews (29 truth tellers and 23 liars) could be analysed. An independent rater coded the 52 
transcribed interviews and photographs discussed during the interview. For each photograph the 
coder noted the presence of each of the following five categories of suspicious security features: 
CCTV cameras, toilets, drains, manholes, and bins, and each of the following two innocuous 
security features: windows and rooftops. Each time a category of security feature was included in a 
photograph a score of ‘1’ was given. An aggregated score was created which could range from 0 
(none of the features included) to 5 (all five categories of features included) for suspicious security 
features, and could range from 0 to 2 for innocuous security features.  
 For each photograph the coder further noted whether the participant reported the presence of 
the five suspicious and two innocuous security feature categories. Each time a category of security 
feature was mentioned a score of ‘1’ was given. An aggregated score was created which could range 
from 0 (none of the features mentioned) to 5 (all five features mentioned) for suspicious security 
features and from 0 to 2 for innocuous security features. 
 A second coder coded a sample of 15 participants’ photographs. The two sets of ratings were 
compared to assess inter-rater reliability. For features in the photograph (suspicious and innocuous 
combined) Intra Class Coefficient = 0.95, and for mentioning the features in the interview ICC = 
0.89.  
 Apart from whether the features were present in the photographs and were reported, we also 
calculated the ratio between the two i.e. features reported divided by features present. The ratio 
score could range from 0 to 1, where a 1 would indicate that all features that were present in the 
photograph would be reported by the participant.  
  A third rater coded all photographs discussed in the interviews and judged how 
good/appealing the photograph makes the square look (1 very poor to 7 very good), and how 
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prominent the suspicious and innocuous features were in each photograph (1 not at all to 7 very 
prominent). A fourth coder coded a sample of 15 participants’ photographs discussed during the 
interviews. The two sets of ratings were compared to assess inter-rater reliability. For appeal the 
ICC = 0.67, for prominence of suspicious features ICC = 0.62 and for prominence of innocuous 
features ICC = 0.89.  
  Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 Truth tellers (M = 5.27, SD = 1.48) believed there was a greater likelihood that they would 
receive the money than liars (M = 3.97, SD = 1.84), F(1, 78) = 12.03, p = 0.001, d = 0.78, and  truth 
tellers (M = 2.88, SD = 1.73) believed there was less likelihood of having to write a statement than 
liars (M = 3.92, SD = 1.82), F(1, 78) = 6.86, p = 0.011, d = 0.58. Truth tellers (M = 3.51, SD = 1.79) 
also thought the interview required less cognitive effort than liars (M = 4.90, SD = 1.35), F(1, 78) = 
15.12, p < 0.001, d = 0.89, and truth tellers (M = 3.00, SD = 1.66) found the interview less mentally 
difficult than liars (M = 4.00, SD = 1.55), F(1, 78) = 7.72, p = 0.007, d = 0.62). There was no 
difference between truth tellers (M = 5.93, SD = 0.96) and liars (M = 5.92, SD = 0.98) in how 
motivated they claimed they were to appear convincing during the interview; F(1,78) = 0.000, p = 
0.986, d = 0.01. These mean scores (almost 6 on a 7-point scale) suggest that both truth tellers and 
liars were highly motivated. 
Hypotheses testing 
 Data were analysed with Chi-square analyses or analyses of variance with Veracity (truth 
versus lie) as the only factor. In addition, we carried out some analyses of covariance with Veracity 
as factor and the prominence of features as a covariate.  
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Table 2. Interview Results as a Function of Veracity: Innocuous Features 
 Truth tellers’ 
promotion  
(N = 29) 
Liars’ promotion  
(N = 23) 
   
 M SD M SD F p d 
Photograph’s appeal (7 point scale) 3.20 .79 3.12 .94 .09 .76 0.09 
Photographs- innocuous features 
prominent (7 point scale) 
4.02 1.06 3.66 1.11 1.41 .24 0.33 
Number of innocuous features in 
photograph 
1.46 .37 1.30 .44 1.92 .17 0.39 
Number of innocuous features reported .03 .08 .13 .24 4.45 .04 0.63 
5.581 .02 
Ratio of innocuous features reported to 
innocuous features photographed  
.02 .05 .11 .21 5.05 .03 0.69 
5.711 .02 
1 Controlled for the innocuous features being prominent in the promotion photographs via an 
analysis of covariance 
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Table 3. Interview Results as a Function of Veracity: Suspicious Features 
 Truth tellers’ 
promotion  
(N = 29) 
Liars’ promotion  
(N = 23) 
   
 M SD M SD F p d 
Photographs- suspicious features 
prominent (7 point scale) 
2.21 .71 2.83 1.33 4.65 .036 0.61 
Number of suspicious features in 
photograph 
1.64 .57 1.49 .67 .68 .41 0.24 
Number of suspicious features reported .01 .04 .14 .24 8.48 .005 0.93 
3.821 .056 
Ratio of suspicious features reported to 
suspicious features photographed  
.006 .02 .11 .22 5.93 .02 0.87 
1.261 .27 
  
1 Controlled for the suspicious features being prominent in the promotion photographs via an 
analysis of covariance 
 
 Cooperation with the Mime Artist. A similar percentage of truth tellers (76%) and liars 
(72%) had taken a picture of the mime artist, χ2 (1, N = 50) = .10, p = .750, Ф = .05, but truth tellers 
(36%) were more likely than liars (8%) to tell the mime artist that they had taken a picture of him, 
χ2 (1, N = 50) = 5.71, p = .017, Ф = .34. In addition, truth tellers (60%) were significantly more 
likely than liars (20%) to allow him to see the photograph (χ2 (1, N = 50) = 8.33, p = .004, Ф  
= .41.This supports Hypothesis 1. In fact, 82% of those who told the mime artist that they had taken 
a photograph of him were truth tellers; and 75% of those who allowed the mime artist to look at the 
photographs were truth tellers.  
 Reporting photograph features during the Interview. Table 2 indicates that liars’ and 
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truth tellers’ promotional photographs were rated as equally appealing. Liars reported more 
suspicious security features than truth tellers. However, the suspicious features were more 
prominent in the liar’s promotional photographs and so liars perhaps found it difficult to avoid 
mentioning them. Indeed, when we controlled for how prominent the suspicious features were (in 
an analysis of covariance), the differences between liars and truth tellers in reporting them were no 
longer significant. In contrast, although the number of innocuous features did not differ between the 
liars’ and truth tellers’ photographs, liars reported them more, even when we controlled for how 
prominent the innocuous features were in the photographs. This supports Hypothesis 2. Tables 2 
and 3 (ratio scores) also show that most of the suspicious and innocuous features that were on the 
photographs were not reported. When we considered how many participants reported security 
features, it was found that 48% of liars and 21% of truth tellers reported at least one suspicious or 
innocuous security feature. This association between mentioning security features and veracity was 
significant, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 4.29, p = .038, Ф = .29, and again supports Hypothesis 2. 
 
Table 4. Liars’ Interview Results as a Function of Type of Mission: Innocuous Features  
 Liars mission 
(N = 23) 
Liars promotion 
(N = 23) 
   
 M SD M SD F p d 
Photographs appeal (7 point scale) 2.11 .79 3.12 .94 13.41 .001 1.16 
Photographs innocuous features prominent (7 
point scale) 
3.93 1.28 3.66 1.11 .56 .46 0.23 
Number of innocuous features in photograph 1.07 .56 1.30 .44 2.17 .16 0.46 
Number of innocuous features reported .23 .32 .13 .24 1.89 .18 0.36 
Ratio of innocuous features reported to 
innocuous features photographed  
.23 .31 .11 .21 2.09 .16 0.46 
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Table 5. Liars’ Interview Results as a Function of Type of Mission: Suspicious Features 
 Liars mission 
(N = 23) 
Liars promotion 
(N = 23) 
   
 M SD M SD F p d 
        
Photographs suspicious features prominent (7 
point scale) 
4.15 1.42 2.83 1.33 9.95 .005 0.96 
Number of suspicious features in photograph 1.14 .68 1.49 .67 3.90 .06 0.52 
Number of suspicious features reported .32 .31 .14 .24 4.34 .049 0.67 
0.573 .46 
Ratio of suspicious features reported to 
suspicious features photographed  
.38 .40 .11 .22 7.55 .01 0.87 
0.933 .35 
        
3Controlled for the suspicious features being prominent in the mission and promotion pictures 
 
 
Liars’ Mission and Promotional Photographs Comparison. Table 4 indicates that liars’ 
promotional photographs were rated as more appealing than their mission photographs, supporting 
Hypothesis 3. In addition, Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the suspicious, but not the innocuous, 
security features were more prominent in the mission photographs than in the promotional 
photographs, partially supporting Hypothesis 3. The number of suspicious security features did not 
differ between liars’ mission and promotional photographs, but liars reported such features more 
when discussing the mission photographs. A ratio of .38 indicates that they mostly avoided 
reporting such features in the mission photographs but a possible reason why they mentioned them 
more in the mission than in the promotional photographs is that such features were more prominent 
in the mission photographs and therefore liars found it hard to avoid mentioning them. Indeed, 
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when we controlled for how prominent the suspicious security features were (in an analysis of 
covariance), differences in reporting these features in the mission and promotional photographs 
disappeared. No differences emerged regarding the innocuous security features, which incidentally 
were largely unreported (low ratios).  
Discussion 
Although similar percentages of truth tellers and liars photographed the mime artist, liars were less 
likely to admit to photographing the mime and to allow him to see the photographs. This suggests 
that liars were more reluctant to comply with external requests than truth tellers. Similar findings 
have been reported by Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hope and Leal (2012) in a study where an an undercover 
interviewer who posed as a photography student asked truth tellers and liars whether he could take a 
photograph of them. More truth tellers than liars complied with his request. We believe that 
‘cooperation’ with an undercover interviewer has potential as a diagnostic cue to deceit.  
Interestingly, the cue ‘cooperation’ may be relevant particularly to undercover interviews. In more 
formal interviews, liars will probably realise that lack of cooperation may appear suspicious and 
they therefore may be more willing to cooperate in formal than in undercover interviews.    
 One could argue that the finding that similar percentages of truth tellers and liars took 
photographs of the mime artist was unexpected. Liars often deem it necessary to minimise the 
number of potential witnesses to their activity (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 
2012). Indeed research has shown that liars include fewer witnesses in their drawings of recalled events 
than truth tellers (Vrij, Leal et al., 2010; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2012). Vrij and colleagues have 
argued that witnesses could provide accounts of the liars’ suspicious behaviour, and liars prefer to 
distance themselves from any potentially incriminating information, termed the ‘avoid and escape’ 
strategy (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). The fact that so many liars (72%) have photographed the 
mimic could be down to a practical issue. The space liars were instructed to photograph was limited, 
and the mime artist was freely mobile within the space. In order to attain the necessary photographs, 
liars may have been compelled to on occasion include the mime artist in the photographs too. 
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Alternatively, they may have been so focussed on the mission and the parts of the square they 
wanted to photograph that they did not even notice the mime artist. Finally, the mime artist was a 
prominent and enjoyable presence at the square and perhaps liars realised that he could feature well 
in their promotional photographs.   
Reporting Security Features during the Interview. The dedicated promotional photographs from 
truth tellers and liars did not differ in terms of appeal, which demonstrated that liars succeeded in 
taking convincing photographs for their cover story. Yet, the way they discussed these promotional 
photographs in the formal interview served to highlight their deception. Although the number of 
suspicious security features did not differ between liars’ and truth tellers’ promotional photographs, 
liars reported them more frequently. This may be a tactical move by liars. When suspicious security 
features are prominent in the promotional photographs, failing to address them may have looked 
suspicious. There also may be cognitive dissonance at play, in which they believe two contradictory 
things. In this case, it is the discrepancy between the clear presence of the suspicious security 
features and the need to avoid mentioning them. This is supported by the finding that when the 
prominence of suspicious security features were controlled for there was no longer a significant 
difference between liars and truth tellers in reporting them.  
Although the number of innocuous security features did not differ between the liars’ and 
truth tellers’ promotional photographs, liars reported them more frequently, even when we 
controlled for how prominent the innocuous security features were in the promotional photographs. 
The move to openly discuss seemingly innocent security features could be the result of the ironic 
monitoring process. The fact that liars discussed innocuous security features more than truth tellers 
is interesting given that liars took effort to hide the aim of their mission (indicated by the low ratios 
of reporting innocuous as well as suspicious security features in the mission photographs).  
Implications. Undercover interviewing could be useful in sensitive situations. If the 
photographer is innocent, some friendly questions about their photographs by an undercover 
interviewer are unlikely to cause wariness or unease. Indeed this has been shown in a previous 
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study where actual members of the public were approached by an undercover interviewer in a 
casual and personable manner, and all proceeded to speak with him (Vrij et al, 2012). If the 
photographer has illicit intentions, it also may be preferable for an undercover interviewer to 
approach them rather than an identifiable law enforcement official who may cause them to react 
suddenly either on their own or by alerting accomplices, which could have potentially catastrophic 
consequences. 
The results are interesting for lie detection and particularly counter terrorism measures. 
Approaching the photographer in an undercover manner could elicit an incriminating response (or 
indeed one that is indicative of innocence). Naturally the investigator does not have to pose as a 
mime artist, but could take the guise of a fellow tourist or photographer for example. If the 
photographer's reaction to them gives rise to suspicion, the suspect could be brought in for a formal 
interview and questioned about the photographs. 
We appreciate that ethical considerations need to be made when undertaking undercover 
investigations. The 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), states that ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence’ (Article 8(1)). This is further qualified by Article 8(2) 
in its assertion that ‘There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary... in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime... or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ (Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14). Therefore 
investigators deploying undercover operations must ensure that in the likely event of breaching 
Article 8(1), the operation is lawful and pursuant to legitimate aim, as outlined in Article 8(2) 
(Harfield & Harfield, 2005).  
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Conclusion 
To our knowledge this is the first investigation to explore the link between photography and 
deception. Liars were less cooperative than truth tellers in discussing their photographs with an 
undercover interviewer. When discussing the photographs in a formal interview liars reported the 
innocuous security features more frequently than truth tellers. The findings suggest that 
photography and deception is a subject that could prove important to explore to benefit forensic and 
counter-terrorist practice. 
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Part III Collective Interviewing to Detect Deception 
Chapter 5: Experiment 4a) ‘Who Should I look at?’ 
Abstract 
Pairs of liars and pairs of truth tellers were interviewed and the amount of eye contact they made 
with the interviewer and each other was coded. Given that liars take their credibility less for granted 
than truth tellers, we expected liars to monitor the interviewer to see whether they were being 
believed, and to try harder to convince the interviewer that they were telling the truth. It was 
hypothesized that this monitoring would manifest itself through more eye contact with the 
interviewer and less eye contact with each other than in the case of truth tellers. A total of 43 pairs 
of participants took part in the experiment. Truth tellers had lunch in a nearby restaurant. Liars took 
some money from a purse, and were asked to pretend that instead of taking the money, they had 
been to a nearby restaurant together for lunch. Pairs of liars looked less at each other and displayed 
more eye contact with the interviewer than pairs of truth tellers. The implications of these findings 
are discussed. 
Who should I look at? 
Eye Contact during Collective Interviewing as a Cue to Deceit 
The threat of terrorism has led to an increased emphasis on the detection of deception in 
public spaces including country borders, security checkpoints, bus terminals, train stations, 
shopping malls, and sport venues (Cooke & Winner, 2008; Driskell, Salas, & Driskell, in press; 
Kimery, 2008). Deception detection in such situations differs in several ways from deception 
detection in police suspect interviews, the traditional domain of forensic deception research (Vrij & 
Granhag, in press; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). For example, in police interviews investigators 
typically focus on a suspect’s past activities, but in homeland security settings investigators are 
often interested in someone’s future activities (e.g., intentions). Deception research about intentions 
has commenced with the publication of six experimental studies (Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall, 
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2011; Granhag & Knieps, 2011; Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Granhag, 
2011; Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hope, & Leal, in press; Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Leal, Forrester, & Fisher, 
2011). Another difference is that in homeland security settings investigators, and particularly those 
who are working in an undercover capacity, sometimes have good reason not to tell the interviewees 
that the ‘chat’ they have with them is in fact an interview. For this reason researchers have started to 
conduct deception research in which undercover interviewers conduct interviews without the 
interviewees being aware that they are being interviewed (Vrij et al., in press). A third difference is 
that terrorist acts are often planned and executed by groups rather than individuals (Crenshaw, 
1990). For example, the terrorists travelled together to London to carry out the London 2005 
bombings.  Consequently researchers have started to conduct deception research involving groups 
of truth tellers and liars (Driskell et al., in press; Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003; Meijer, 
Smulders, & Merckelbach, 2010; Vrij et al., 2009). A fourth difference is that police suspect 
interviews are typically focussed on solving crimes through obtaining admissions or confessions 
from suspects, whereas homeland security interviews are more about gathering information (Borum, 
2006; Brandon, 2011; Driskell et al., in press; Loftus, 2011). The third and fourth reasons combined 
demonstrate the relevance of collective interviewing, that is, interviewing people together. If people 
have jointly experienced events or have made joint preparations for a forthcoming activity it makes 
sense to interview them together about it because in collective interviews people recall more 
information about shared experiences than when they are interviewed separately about these shared 
activities (Hollingshead, 1998; Rajaram, 2011; Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2010; Ross, Blatz, & 
Schryer, 2008; Wegner, 1987; Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991). 
The present experiment dealt with collective interviewing and we examined mutual gaze 
between the pairs of interviewees and the extent to which the interviewees made eye contact with 
the interviewer. Eye contact is a fundamental aspect of interaction and communication (Frischen, 
Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007; Kleinke, 1986) and is investigated as a nonverbal cue to deception 
frequently (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). Both laypeople and professional lie detectors expect 
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liars to exhibit gaze aversion, that is, to look away from the interviewer (Strömwall, Granhag, & 
Hartwig, 2004; Vrij, 2004, 2008; Vrij, Akehurst, & Knight, 2006). However, meta-analyses revealed 
that gaze patterns are not a diagnostic cue to deceit (DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 
2007). In fact, DePaulo et al. (2003) report an effect size of d = .03 for the relationship between 
gaze and deception. Despite the fact that gaze patterns have not been found to be diagnostic for 
deceit we decided to examine eye gaze again as we predicted that it would be indicative of deceit 
when pairs of suspects are concerned.  
Research on truth tellers’ and liars’ preferred strategies during interviews gives insight into which 
gaze patterns may arise. It has been found that, when asked to recall an event, truth tellers 
reconstruct the event from memory and prefer a ‘tell it all’ approach, aiming to provide a detailed 
description of what happened. In contrast, liars do not reconstruct a story but report their planned 
alibi. In terms of detail, they prefer a ‘keep it simple’ approach; incorporating enough detail so as 
not to raise suspicion, but avoiding giving excessive detail for fear that the interviewer may know or 
could subsequently find out that the story is fabricated  (Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003; 
Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). 
When pairs of truth tellers implement their ‘tell it all’ approach during an interview, they may 
communicate substantially with each other in an attempt to collectively recall all the details they 
know, and to correct each other’s stories. In this respect, Hollingshead (1998) refers to transaction 
information search in which group members work together to retrieve information by cuing one 
another, posing questions to one another, and verbalising connections. Transactive memory refers to 
a shared system in which information is encoded, stored and retrieved collectively in 
groups (Wegner, 1987).  
Retrieving transactive memories of a shared event is social and interactive; thus people recalling an 
actual jointly experienced event will do so in a different manner to people attempting to recall a 
fabricated event. Truth tellers will retrieve their information through a transactive memory system 
in which responsibility for encoding information is shared and divided, and retrieval of information 
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involves the group working together, e.g. by cueing one another and posing questions to one 
another. Conversely liars will rely on their individual cognitive ability to construct a story that 
matches with what the other people in their group are saying (Hollingshead, 1998). 
 
During this group recall process individuals are likely to gaze at each other, as this is 
typically what people do when they communicate (Frischen et al., 2007; Kleinke, 1986). In contrast, 
pairs of liars’ ‘keep it simple’ approach may result in less communication between the liars. For 
example, one liar may take the lead in giving the answer and the other liar may not add or correct 
much. Less communication between the pair would therefore take place, resulting in less gazing 
towards each other. In sum, we predicted that pairs of truth tellers would look more at each other 
than pairs of liars (Hypothesis 1).  
Driskell et al. (in press) also examined gaze in their experiment about collective 
interviewing and found that truthful pairs of interviewees indeed looked more at each other than 
deceptive pairs of interviewees, the effect we hypothesised in Hypothesis 1. However, they did not 
examine making eye contact with the interviewer. To justify this they refer to DePaulo et al.’s (2003) 
meta-analysis which showed that gaze did not emerge as a diagnostic cue to deceit. In addition, they 
quote Ekman and Friesen (1972) who argued that nonverbal behaviour may be especially indicative 
of deceit when individuals are alone, because in that situation his/her nonverbal behaviour is less 
subject to inhibition or control for social reasons. In other words, social factors are seen as noise by 
Ekman and Friesen (Driskell et al., in press). 
We examined making eye contact with the interviewer because there are good reasons to 
predict that pairs of liars will make more eye contact with the interviewer than pairs of truth tellers. 
Firstly, it could be a simple effect of opportunity. Since liars will look less at each other than truth 
tellers they will have more opportunity to make eye contact with the interviewer. Secondly, liars 
take their credibility less for granted than truth tellers and are therefore more inclined than truth tellers 
to try to appear convincing (Kassin, Appleby, & Torkildson-Perillo, 2010) and people attempt to 
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persuade others by looking them in the eyes (Frischen et al., 2007; Kleinke, 1986). Thirdly, because 
liars do not take credibility for granted, they may monitor the interviewer's reactions more carefully 
in order to assess whether they appear to be getting away with their lie (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; 
Schweitzer, Brodt, & Croson, 2002). We therefore hypothesised that pairs of liars would make more 
eye contact with the interviewer than pairs of truth tellers (Hypothesis 2). Of course, attempting to 
appear convincing and monitoring the interview also applies to individual liars, yet in individual 
settings no difference between liars and truth tellers in making eye contact with interviewers seem 
to emerge. A possible explanation is that in such interviews truth tellers also look at the interviewer, 
not so much because they try to convince or monitor the interviewer but for the simple reason that 
they communicate with them and are inclined to make eye contact with the person they are 
communicating with. In collective interviews the presence of a second interviewee gives truth 
tellers a good reason to look away from the interviewer and therefore differences between truth 
tellers and liars in making eye contact with the interviewer may emerge.  
  We also examined the strategies that truth tellers and liars reported to have planned to use 
during the interview (asked in a questionnaire before the interview), and the strategies they reported 
to have used during the interview (asked in a questionnaire after the interview). Because liars tend 
to take their credibility less for granted than truth tellers, we predicted that liars are more likely to 
have planned and executed strategies than truth tellers (Hypothesis 3). The content of the strategies 
could also differ. Liars will place more emphasis on trying to appear more convincing than truth 
tellers (Hypothesis 4), and this may be reflected verbally (e.g., by controlling stuttering) and/or 
nonverbally (e.g., the desire to gaze at the interviewer). 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 86 participants took part, 25 of whom were male (29%). The average age of 
participants was M = 22.04 (SD = 6.38) years.  
Procedure 
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Pairs of friends, partners or colleagues were recruited under the guise of a study to find out 
how well they know each other. We recruited pairs who knew each other because this reflects real 
life situations: criminals acting together are likely to know each other as well. Each pair was 
randomly allocated to either the lying or truth telling condition. 
Upon arrival, pairs of truth tellers (N = 21) were told that the study would take place in a 
nearby shopping complex and were taken there by an experimenter. On reaching the shopping 
complex, the experimenter pretended to receive a text informing them that the study was delayed. 
Purportedly as compensation, the participants were offered lunch in a restaurant where they were 
left alone and then collected by the experimenter 45 minutes later. 
After returning to the laboratory, participants were told that £10 had gone missing from the 
department whilst they were having lunch. They were informed that they were suspected of having 
taken it and would be interviewed about their recent activities to assess whether they were guilty or 
not. They were given time to prepare for the interview together but were not told whether they 
would be interviewed together or separately. 
On arriving at the laboratory, pairs of liars (N = 22) were asked to ‘steal’ £10 from a purse in 
a separate office and return to the laboratory. On their return, they were informed that they were 
suspected of having taken the money and would be interviewed about their activities during the past 
hour. Their alibi would be that they had gone to a restaurant in the shopping complex for lunch. As 
with the truth tellers, they were given time to prepare together but were not informed as to how the 
interview would be conducted. The scenario is derived from Strömwall, Granhag, and Jonsson 
(2003) and Vrij et al. (2009). 
To motivate participants to perform well, they were told that if the interviewer believed 
them, they would receive a total of £10 each. If they were not believed, they would not receive any 
money and may be asked to write a statement detailing their whereabouts during the time the money 
went missing. In fact all participants were ultimately given the £10 reward following debriefing. 
After their preparation, the pairs were split up and individuals were each taken to separate 
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rooms to complete a pre interview questionnaire which asked about their preparation e.g., ‘Did you 
develop an interview strategy together with your friend?’, and ‘If so please describe this strategy’. 
There were questions about whether they had discussed with their friend what to say and how to 
behave during the interview, on 7-point Likert scales ranging from (1) not at all to (7) thoroughly. 
They were also asked to rate how thorough, sufficient and good their preparation talks were on 
three individual scales ranging from (1) not at all to (7) extremely. 
After completing the questionnaire, pairs of participants were taken to the interview room to 
be interviewed together. They were informed they would be audio and visually recorded. The 
interviewer was blind as to the veracity condition of the participants. They were asked about their 
experience in the restaurant through general, spatial and temporal questions, based on a format from 
a previous study (Vrij et al., 2009). Examples of questions include: ‘Can you tell me in as much 
detail as possible what you did while you were in the restaurant?’ (general);  ‘In relation to the front 
door, where did you and your friend sit?’ (spatial); and ‘How long did it take between the staff 
taking your order and receiving your food?’ (temporal). The interviewer was instructed to be 
conscious of her eye gaze in order to address each participant as equally as possible, and not to 
influence who would answer the question. 
After the interview, pairs were split up once more and the individuals asked to complete a 
post interview questionnaire. This asked about how motivated they were to appear convincing on a 
7-point Likert scale ranging from (1) not at all motivated to (7) extremely motivated. They were 
also asked if there were any awkward moments during the interview on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from (1) none at all to (7) plenty. The questionnaire also contained open ended questions 
about details of the strategies they had planned and executed (summarised in Table 6), and whether 
there was a particular behavioural pattern they felt they should have displayed in order to be 
believed. 
Coding 
Interviews were videotaped and coded by a rater who was blind to the veracity status of the 
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pairs. Frequency of eye contact with (i) each other (i.e. the amount they looked into each other’s 
eyes), and (ii) the interviewer was coded on 7-point Likert scales ranging from (1) no incidence of 
eye contact to (7) high incidence of eye contact. A second rater coded a random sample of 15 
interviews. Inter-rater reliability scores (Pearson correlations) were high (eye gaze with interviewer: 
r = .83, eye gaze with each other: r = .74).  
Strategies reported by participants were categorised according to themes, e.g., to keep calm, 
to improvise, to stick to an alibi. These categories were determined after examining the data. They 
were categorised by two independent raters with an inter-rater reliability score of r = .55.  A 
comparison between the two coders revealed that one coder used the miscellaneous category more 
often than the other. In those instances in which one strategy was classified as miscellaneous by one 
coder but as categorical by another coder, we selected the categorical coding.  
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 Participants had an average rating of M = 5.74 (SD = 1.40) on the 7-point motivation scale 
which means that they were highly motivated to appear convincing. However, although truth tellers 
were clearly motivated (M = 5.24, SD = 1.61), liars rated themselves as being even more motivated 
(M = 6.26, SD = 0.90), F(1, 86) = 13.03, p = 0.001, d = 0.81. Truth tellers rated themselves as being 
more likely to receive the cash reward (M = 5.49, SD = 1.47) when compared to liars (M = 4.56, SD 
= 1.65), F(1,86) = 7.81, p = 0.006, d = 0.60. Truth tellers rated themselves as being less likely to 
have to write the statement (M = 2.89, SD = 1.56) when compared to liars (M = 4.07, SD = 1.58), 
F(1,86) = 12.48, p = 0.001, d = 0.75. In summary, the participants were highly motivated to be 
convincing and the reward and penalty instructions appeared plausible.  
Eye Movements 
Two one way ANOVAs were conducted with Veracity as between-subjects factor and 
making eye contact with the interviewer and looking at each other as dependent variables. There 
was a significant Veracity effect for the amount of eye gaze with the interviewer, F(1,41) = 6.61, p 
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= .014, d = 0.77, with liars making more eye contact with the interviewer (M = 5.18, SD = 1.10) 
than truth tellers (M = 4.26, SD = 1.18) . In addition, truth tellers (M = 3.74, SD = 1.57) looked 
more at each other than liars (M = 3.00, SD = 1.41), F(1,41) = 4.11 p = .049, d = 0.62. These 
findings support Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Strategies 
A Multivariate analysis was conducted on strategies detailed in the pre and post interview 
questionnaires (Table 6), F(7, 71) = 202.90, p < .001. Liars rated their preparation talks as being 
significantly more thorough and sufficient and of higher quality than truth tellers. Similarly, liars 
had significantly more of a discussion than truth tellers on what to say and how to behave during the 
interview. 
More liars (N = 31) than truth tellers (N = 12) developed a strategy prior to the interview; (χ² 
= 18.16, df = 1, p < .001). This finding supports Hypothesis 3. Truth tellers largely reported that the 
reason they did not prepare a strategy before the interview was because they found it unnecessary 
(N = 28), or they used a “stick to the story/tell them how it was” strategy (N = 13). Liars’ reported 
strategies were using an alibi/proof (N = 28) and behaving calmly and not stuttering (N = 11), which 
supports Hypothesis 4. These strategies are summarised in Table 7. 
In the post interview questionnaire, liars reported experiencing more awkward moments 
during the interview than truth tellers. Liars also felt more so than truth tellers that there was a 
particular behavioural pattern they should have displayed in order to be believed. When asked what 
this was, the most frequent response amongst liars was to have behaved more calmly (N = 8). A less 
frequent response amongst liars was that they should have been less nervous (N = 6). A proportion 
of liars mentioned eye contact (N=8), such as their eye contact with each other and with the 
interviewer. Of these comments the most common was that they should have made less eye contact 
with each other (N = 5). 
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Table 6: Questionnaire Responses of Liars and Truth Tellers 
 
 Asked 
Pre/Post 
interview 
    Truth      Lie F p 
  M SD M SD   
Extent of discussion 
about what to say 
during the interview  
Pre 3.77 1.87 5.49 1.26 25.14 <0.001 
Extent of discussion 
about how to 
behave during the 
interview  
Pre 2.33 1.49 3.67 1.82 14.32 <0.001 
Thoroughness of 
preparation talks 
Pre 3.86 1.69 5.44 1.23 23.73 <0.001 
Quality of 
preparation talks 
Pre 4.35 1.86 5.35 1.39 7.62 0.007 
Motivation to 
appear 
convincing during 
interview 
Post 5.24 1.61 6.26 0.90 13.03 0.001 
Awkward moments 
experienced during 
the interview 
Post 2.29 1.06 3.56 1.40 23.11 <0.001 
Should have 
displayed 
particular 
behavioural 
pattern in order to 
be believed 
Post 1.69 1.29 3.50 2.04 24.81 <0.001 
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Table 7: Summaries of Strategies as Reported by Participants 
 
Strategy Number of truth tellers who 
report it 
Number of liars who report it 
Strategy is not 
useful/necessary 
28 4 
Will use alibi/proof 2 28 
Stick to story/told them how 
it was 
13 0 
Behave calmly 1 11 
Give a lot of detail 6 11 
Based on past experience 0 3 
 
Discussion 
We compared the eye gaze patterns displayed by pairs of truth tellers and pairs of liars. Pairs 
of truth tellers looked more at each other than pairs of liars and pairs of liars made more eye contact 
with the interviewer than pairs of truth tellers.  
The finding of a mutual gaze between pairs of truth tellers is a replication of Driskell et al. 
(in press). . The fact that two independent labs have obtained the same result strengthens the 
ecological validity of this result. This novel finding contradicts the stereotypical belief that liars 
look away (Strömwall et al., 2004; Vrij, 2004, 2008; Vrij et al., 2006). One explanation for this gaze 
pattern is that liars attempt to convince the interviewer of their truthfulness more than truth tellers. 
Indeed when examining strategies from this study, prior to the interview liars stated intentions such 
as ‘To behave calmly, not to ... show we are worried’. Post interview, liars indicated that they were 
concerned they had looked at each other too much and did not maintain enough eye contact with the 
interviewer. This supports the idea that liars believe looking at the interviewer will increase their 
credibility.  It is also possible that liars will have less reason to communicate with each other and so 
will have more opportunity to look at the interviewer. In other words, the effect of making eye 
contact with the interviewer has more opportunity to occur in collective interviews rather than 
single interviews. Future research could examine this hypothesis. 
In contrast, truth tellers stated that they found preparing a strategy unnecessary, stating that 
‘the facts/information will speak for themselves’ and ‘you don’t need a strategy in order to be 
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honest’. This indicates that truth tellers are less likely to try to be especially convincing, perhaps 
because they believe that the truth shines through anyway. This phenomenon is known as the 
‘illusion of transparency’ (Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 1998) and is evident in the current study 
as significantly more liars than truth tellers developed a strategy, and that liars rated their 
preparation talks as being significantly more thorough, sufficient and good than truth tellers. 
 In the present experiment the interviewer addressed each participant equally in terms of eye 
gaze, but manipulations are possible in this respect. For example, if the interviewer responds to eye 
gaze by either ignoring or returning it which may affect the interviewee. To determine whether the 
interviewer is in fact being monitored to see if they believe the interviewee, the interviewer could 
intentionally appear agreeable or sceptical and examine how the interviewee responds. Another 
possibility would be for interviewers to direct their eye gaze more at one interviewee than another 
in the collective group to see if it influences the pattern of response. In the current study gaze 
behaviour was coded by raters who observed the videotaped interviews. In the future researchers 
could examine whether interviewers themselves can accurately rate the interviewees’ gaze patterns. 
It is not our intention to promote collective interviewing as a substitute for individual 
interviewing.  This is one reason why we did not include an individual interviewing condition in our 
experiment. Interviewing suspects individually allows investigators to examine content cues such as 
discrepancies between stories of multiple suspects, which could be an efficient way to detect deceit 
when the correct questions are asked as research has shown (Vrij et al., 2009). With this in mind, we 
propose that collective interviewing can be used in addition to individual interviewing in certain 
settings. Homeland security settings (interviews at country borders, security check points, bus 
stations, train stations, shopping malls and sporting venues) are examples for when collective 
interviewing is appropriate. In such situations investigators might use collective interviewing by 
way of an initial screening interview. So they could employ collective interviewing and, if the group 
raises suspicion, follow protocol for investigating suspicious behaviour (e.g. thoroughly checking 
the contents of the cars and/or possessions of the persons, or indeed proceeding to interview 
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individuals separately.). Although the current study examined collective interviewing amongst pairs, 
the technique is not limited to pairs and could be used with groups of more than two individuals. 
Future research could examine interviewing with larger groups to ascertain whether the 
communicative patterns differ. Another possible line of research would be to indeed use the 
collective interview as a ‘screening’ interview before splitting suspects up, as suggested, to 
determine whether it could provide viable cues to deceit. 
Our deception scenario reflects a formal police interview setting, but the present findings 
also have ecological validity for homeland security settings. Police interviews differ from security 
setting interviews in at least two ways. Firstly, police interviews are more formal. Secondly, in 
police interviews past activities are typically discussed whereas in homeland security settings, past 
as well as future activities (e.g., intentions) are discussed. The rationale on which the findings in the 
current study were based i.e., that liars distance themselves from revealing details they think will 
raise suspicion, also applies to informal interviews and discussions about intentions. So from a 
theoretical point of view, the findings we obtained in the present experiment are still applicable in 
these situations. 
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Chapter 6: Experiment 4b) Collective Interviewing of Suspects 
Abstract 
Pairs of truth tellers and pairs of liars were interviewed together about a shared experience. Given 
that in interviews truth tellers tend to adopt a “tell it all” strategy whereas liars prefer to keep their 
stories simple, we predicted that pairs of truth tellers would (i) interrupt and (ii) correct each other 
more, and would (iii) add more information to each other’s answers than pairs of liars. The results 
supported these hypotheses. Theory-driven interventions to elicit more cues to deception through 
simultaneous interviewing are discussed. 
 
Introduction 
 Deception research typically focuses on individual truth tellers and liars whereas criminals 
often commit crimes in groups. A small number of studies have examined groups of truth tellers and 
groups of liars, and in these studies the group members were interviewed separately (Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003; Meijer, Smulders, & Merckelbach, in press; Vrij et al., 2009). This 
separate interviewing of group members may reflect many real -life interviewing contexts, but there 
are good reasons to consider interviewing group members together. First, conditions suited to 
collective interviewing occur frequently (e.g., road border controls where cars containing several 
people are checked). Second, it enables interviewers to examine how group members communicate 
with each other when lying. Such communication cues have never been examined in deception 
research but were the topic of this investigation.  
Research on truth tellers’ and liars’ preferred strategies during interviews gives insight into 
which type of communication cues may arise. Truth tellers prefer a ‘tell it all’ approach and aim to 
provide a detailed description of what happened, whereas liars prefer a ‘keep it simple’ approach, 
incorporating fewer details (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007). This differential approach of 
truth tellers and liars could result in differential group interactions when being interviewed 
simultaneously. We predicted that truth tellers would be more likely to interrupt and add 
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information to each other’s accounts while also seeking to correct or amend each other’s account 
more often than liars. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 86 participants (University students and employees) took part, 25 were male (29%) 
and 61 were female (71%). Their average age was M = 22.04 (SD = 6.38) years.  
Procedure 
 The procedure was derived from Vrij et al. (2009). Pairs of friends were recruited under the 
guise of a social communication experiment. Upon arrival in the laboratory, half of the pairs (truth 
tellers) were told that the study was delayed with 45 minutes and that, as compensation, they were 
offered lunch in a nearby restaurant for that period of time. An escort brought each pair to a 
predetermined restaurant and collected them 45 minutes later. When they arrived back at the 
laboratory the pair were told that an amount of money had gone missing during the previous hour 
and that as suspects they would be questioned about their activities in the restaurant. They were 
given as much time as they liked to prepare themselves for the interview but not informed about 
how the interviews would be conducted.  
The other half of the paired participants were allocated the role of liars. Upon arrival in the 
laboratory they were asked to take £10 from an office and to return to the lab. After their return to 
the lab they were told that they would be interviewed about their activities. They were instructed to 
prepare an alibi that would enable them to tell the interviewer that they went together to a nearby 
restaurant for a 45-minute lunch. They were given as much time as they liked to prepare themselves 
for the interview.  
To motivate the truth tellers and liars they were informed that if the interviewer believed the 
participant’s account, they would be paid £10. In contrast, if the interviewer did not believe the 
participant, they would not receive any monetary reward, and may be asked to write a statement 
about their whereabouts during lunch-time instead. 
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 Once each pair of truth tellers or liars indicated they were ready to be interviewed (always 
within 10 minutes), they were taken to the interview room where they were interviewed together. 
The interviewer asked questions about their experiences in the restaurant using a standardised 32-
question interview protocol derived from Vrij et al. (2009). The interviewer did not place any 
constraints on turn-taking during the interview and left it entirely up to the participants to decide 
who would answer each question. 
The interviews were videotaped and coded by a rater who was blind to the hypotheses and 
the veracity status of the pairs. Interruptions were defined as any utterance that took place while the 
other member of the pair was still speaking. Corrections were defined as an explicit contradictions 
uttered subsequently to something the other participant has said (e.g. "No, I think it was on the right 
side, not the left"). Additional information was defined as new information introduced by the other 
participant. The frequency of occurrence of interruptions, corrections and additional information 
was collated. A second rater, blind to the veracity status and hypotheses, coded a random sample of 
15 interviews. Inter-rater reliability scores (Pearson correlations) were high (interruptions: r = .74; 
corrections: r = 78; additional information: r = .89). 
Results 
Data were analysed with a MANOVA with Veracity as between-subjects factor. At a 
multivariate level, the analysis revealed a significant Veracity effect, F(3, 39) = 5.56, p < .01. All 
three univariate Veracity effects were also significant (see Table 8). As predicted, the pairs of truth 
tellers made more interruptions and corrections and added more information than the pairs of liars.  
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Table 8. Participants’ Responses as a Function of Veracity 
 
 Truth Lie F p d 
 M SD M SD    
Interruptions 8.57 8.45 2.73 2.96 9.34 < .01 1.02 
Corrections 1.48 1.75 .14 .35 12.39 < .01 1.34 
Additional information 30.86 13.80 18.32 12.70 9.63 < .01 0.94 
 
Discussion 
We examined the use of communication cues between pairs of truth tellers and between 
pairs of liars as a possible cue to deceit. Truth tellers interrupted and corrected each other more and 
added more information to each other’s stories. This reflects the preferential strategies of truth 
tellers and liars in interviews: Truth tellers prefer to ‘tell it all’ whereas liars prefer to keep their 
stories simple. We can therefore conclude that communication cues can be used to detect deceit. We 
selected the communication cues ‘interruptions’, ‘corrections’ and ‘additional information’ as these 
cues can be easily observed by interviewers. However, other verbal cues may also be worth 
examining, such as ‘dominance’, that is, who does most of the talking. Liars may decide to let one 
person do most of the talking in order to retain the simplicity of the account. Nonverbal cues can be 
worth examining too, such as eye contact. For different reasons we predict that lying pairs would 
look more at the interviewer and less at each other than truth telling pairs. Liars are more inclined 
than truth tellers to try to appear convincing (DePaulo et al., 2003), and people attempt to convince 
others by looking them in the eyes (Kleinke, 1986). Liars take their credibility less for granted than 
truth tellers (Kassin, 2008; Kassin, Appleby, & Torkildson-Perillo, 2010), and as a result they may 
monitor the interviewer's reactions more carefully in order to assess whether they appear to be 
getting away with their lie (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Schweitzer, Brodt, & Croson, 2002). In 
essence, liars may be more concerned with maintaining eye contact with the interviewer than with 
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each other to maintain credibility, whereas eye contact may facilitate natural communication 
between dyads. 
 The current chapter is the first to demonstrate that communication cues displayed by pairs of 
interviewees provide cues to deception. Furthermore, we believe that specific theory-based 
interventions made by the interviewer will also elicit further cues (Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 
2011; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). For example, the interviewer could cut off the first participant 
while s/he is talking and ask the second participant to continue. In cases of fabrication, the second 
participant will then be forced to continue the fabrication started by the first participant. This is 
cognitively demanding if the fabrication has not been prepared in advance and requires good 
improvisation skills from the second participant. Cues of cognitive load (contradictions, implausible 
answers) may occur (Vrij et al., 2009). Interviewers can increase the chance that participants have 
not prepared answers by asking questions which are unanticipated (Vrij et al., 2009).  
Second, the interviewer could repeat some of the questions asked earlier in the interview and 
could hereby indicate which of the two participants should answer the question. A comparison could 
then be made in the overlap in answers when (i) the participant is asked to repeat the information 
s/he gave before and when (ii) the participant is asked to repeat the information the other 
participant gave before. The latter should be more cognitively demanding than the former (Pezdek, 
Lam, & Sperry, 2009) resulting in less overlap and more contradictions.  
In summary, collective interviewing has clear potential for lie detection. We have shown that 
verbal communication cues between pairs of interviewees can reveal deceit, and argued that gaze 
patterns may be useful to examine. When interviewers employ specific theory-based interventions 
further cues could be elicited.  
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Part IV Using Undercover and Collective Interviewing to Detect 
Deception 
Chapter 7: Experiment 5 ‘Erm, What Did I tell the Other Guy?’ 
Abstract 
We examined the potential of undercover interviewing and collective interviewing in eliciting cues 
to deceit in intelligence interviews. Twenty-four pairs of truth tellers and 23 pairs of liars undertook 
a mission in which they were interviewed covertly in a park by an undercover interviewer, and then 
had a later formal, forensic style interview with a second interviewer. Truth tellers and liars went to 
the park for different reasons and carried out somewhat different activities, and liars were instructed 
that if they were asked about their activities to conceal their true reason for visiting the park and to 
pretend to be there for the same reason as truth tellers. Based on theoretical principles about short 
term gains, lack of cognitive flexibility, tendency to avoid reporting potential incriminating 
information, memory deficits, lack of imagination and transaction information search we expected 
liars to be less forthcoming about their meeting with the undercover interviewer and to show less 
overlap in their answers in the undercover and formal interviews. We also expected them to report 
fewer unexpected events, and to consult each other less during the formal interview. The hypotheses 
were supported and the implications for intelligence interviewing are discussed.   
 
Introduction 
 Investigators typically attempt to detect deceit in a one-to-one basis during formal 
interviews (e.g., police suspect interviews), and, unsurprisingly, forensic deception research reflects 
this type of lie detection (Vrij & Granhag, 2012; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010; Vrij, Mann, & Leal, 
in press). However, lie detection is also relevant in different settings. For example, investigators 
working in an undercover capacity may not wish to break their cover by inviting a person of interest 
to a formal interview because it could alert a potential suspect to the fact that they are of interest to 
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investigators. It would also break the cover of the undercover operative which is also a serious (and 
potentially dangerous) issue. 
Undercover interviews are frequently conducted by undercover officers during domestic po-
licing (e.g., investigating drugs cartels, human trafficking and other crimes often carried out by 
complex networks) and by officers who examine terrorist-related events. In addition, investigators 
working at public spaces (e.g., airports, stations, shopping malls) may wish to talk to groups of in-
dividuals rather than single individuals. To address such investigative contexts, researchers have 
started to explore lie detection through undercover interviewing and collective interviewing (Vrij, 
Jundi, et al., 2012; Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hope, & Leal, 2012). Extending this literature in the current 
study, we examined whether undercover interviews can be utilised to establish evidence, and 
whether collective interviews reveal diagnostic cues to deceit when interviewees carry out a joint 
task during the interview. We start with discussing undercover interviewing.  
Undercover Interviewing 
Undercover interviewing refers to conducting interviews without the suspect actually knowing 
they are being interviewed (Vrij et al., 2012). Undercover interviewing has several advantages over 
formal interviewing in a number of investigative contexts. For example, in formal interviews suspects 
may be aware that one of the aims of the interviewer is to judge their veracity, which may hamper lie 
detection. Most lie detection techniques used to date are anxiety based (Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag, 
Mann, & Leal, 2011), and  the assumption of such techniques is that liars; due to their fear of being 
‘caught’, will be more anxious during interviews than truth tellers and will therefore display more or 
stronger cues of anxiety (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010; 
Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Leal, Forrester, & Fisher, 2011). However, truth tellers may also show signs 
of anxiety when they are interviewed, as a consequence of being suspected of wrongdoing or out of 
fear of not being believed (Bond & Fahey, 1987; DePaulo et al., 2003; Ofshe & Leo, 1997). These 
signs of anxiety in truth tellers may, therefore, negate any observable differences in anxiety between 
truth tellers and liars. Because truth tellers should display fewer signs of anxiety when they are 
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unaware of being interviewed, undercover interviews could, therefore, provide more opportunities for a 
differentiation between truth tellers and liars in terms of anxiety. Liars would in theory be more 
anxious than truth tellers during undercover interviews, as they are performing suspicious activities and 
the interview would interrupt their foreseen activities. Indeed research has shown that people who 
make specific plans for the future do not simply memorize their plans (Watanabe, 2005), but ‘pre-
experience’ the event and activate concrete mental images of the future (Granhag, 2010). If liars 
pre-experience their suspicious activities unfolding in a particular way, being interrupted by an 
undercover interview is likely to induce more anxiety than in truth tellers whose activity is innocent 
and therefore unfolding in less tense situations. 
Another advantage is that undercover interviewing may fit particularly well in determining the 
veracity of an individual’s intentions when no crime has yet been committed. In cases where available 
intelligence points to a potential plot or criminal intent but the crime has not yet been committed, a 
formal interview may be inappropriate. Being able to discriminate between true and false intent is of 
supreme importance to police and intelligence work, as it is a fundamental part of crime prevention 
including crimes as serious as terrorist attacks. Recent research by Vrij et al. (2012) demonstrated 
that short undercover interviews can be used to determine whether people are telling the truth or lying 
about their intentions. Amongst other findings, liars were less willing to be photographed, less 
accurate in identifying the places they planned to visit, and less concrete and more uncertain when 
describing their intentions. 
 
The current study tested a possible third advantage of undercover interviewing by examining 
whether they could serve to establish evidence for later interviews. That is, a suspect could be 
interviewed by an undercover interviewer about an apparently innocuous activity, and later on be 
interviewed about the period of time that included the interaction with the undercover interviewer 
by a second interviewer who is aware of the undercover interview but does not reveal this 
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knowledge to the suspect. Will truth tellers and liars differ in how they report that period of time? 
We have reasons to believe that they will, due to liars’ (i) unawareness that the undercover interview 
is an interview, (ii) preference for short term gains, (iii) lack of cognitive flexibility; (iv) tendency to 
avoid reporting information that they fear may be potentially incriminating, (v) memory deficits, 
and (vi) lack of imagination in generating stories/alibis. We also predict that fewer liars than truth 
tellers will mention the undercover interviewer at all. In the current study all participants undertook 
a mission where they were interviewed covertly in a park by one (undercover) interviewer, and then 
had a later formal, forensic style interview with a second interviewer. Truth tellers and liars went to 
the park for different reasons and carried out somewhat different activities, and liars were instructed 
that if they were asked about their activities to conceal their true reason for visiting the park and to 
pretend to be there for the same reason as truth tellers. 
Liars’ Answers Will Show Less Overlap between the Two Interviews 
An advantage of suspects being interviewed twice, as in the present experiment, is that 
investigators may check the overlap in answers between the two interviews. There is a strong belief 
amongst lay persons and professionals that liars are more inconsistent than truth tellers (Strömwall, 
Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004; Vrij, Akehurst, & Knight, 2006). This is not always the case. When 
interviewed twice about an event, liars tend to repeat in the second interview what they have said 
during the first interview, whereas truth tellers try to reconstruct their stories from their memory during 
both interviews. Repetition (liars’ behaviour) leads to more consistent answers than reconstructing a 
story (truth tellers’ behaviour), as research has demonstrated (Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, in press; Granhag, 
& Strömwall, 1999; Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003).  
In the present study the dominant view that liars are more inconsistent in their responses 
than truth tellers may well occur, because we expected liars not to employ their ‘repeat what I have 
said before’ strategy. Firstly, interviewees may be unaware that the initial undercover interview and 
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the second formal interview (carried out by two different interviewers) are related to each other. 
Here, liars may be less likely to repeat what they said in the initial interview in the second, 
seemingly unrelated interview. Secondly, even when interviewees believe that the two interviews 
may be related, the repeat strategy may not be their preferred strategy. Liars are typically keen to 
convince the interviewer and adapt their nonverbal and verbal responses to achieve this goal 
(DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; DePaulo et al., 2003). When answering questions in the second 
interview, the liars’ strategy will be to convince the second interviewer of their honesty and this 
strategy is likely to overshadow their strategy to repeat what they have said to the first interviewer. 
In the liar’s assessment, it is probably more likely that the second interviewer will make a 
judgement of their veracity during the second interview only, than that the second interviewer will 
compare these answers with the answers given in the first interview. In other words, this is a short 
term-long term trade-off situation and in such situations people often favour what is better at the 
time regardless of possible long-term consequences (Gray, 1999).  
In addition, the manner of questioning differs substantially between the undercover 
interview (a survey in the park, discussing forthcoming activities) and the second, more traditional 
interview about someone’s recent activities. This variation in interview type means that the 
questions asked in both interviews, although referring to the same activities, were not identical. 
Asking different questions makes the repeat strategy ineffective as liars cannot just repeat what they 
have said before (Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 2012; Leins, Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2011). We therefore 
predict that liars’ answers will show less overlap between the two interviews than truth tellers’ 
answers (Hypothesis 1). 
Liars Will Spontaneously Mention the Undercover Interview Less Often 
During formal interviews liars need to decide what information to avoid, deny or admit 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). It makes little sense for suspects to avoid or deny information they 
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think the interviewer already knows, but their decision making process is more difficult for pieces 
of information that they believe the interviewer does not know. Research has shown that in such 
situations liars have the tendency to withhold information that they believe could be potentially 
incriminating (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & 
Vrij, 2005). Such a response is related to the basic forms of human behaviour avoidance and escape 
(Carlson, Buskist, & Martin, 2000; Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). In terms of self-regulation this is 
viewed as a manner of establishing control – by avoiding the aversive event altogether (Granhag & 
Hartwig, 2008). Liars often view the presence of witnesses as potentially incriminating because 
witnesses can serve as additional information sources against which investigators can check the 
veracity of the liars’ statement (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012, in press). 
Consistent with this notion, liars included fewer witnesses in their drawings of recalled events than 
truth tellers (Vrij, Leal et al., 2010; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2012). Therefore, based on liars’ 
tendency to withhold potentially incriminating information, we predict that liars will spontaneously 
mention the undercover interview less often than truth tellers in the second interview (Hypothesis 2).  
Liars Will be Less Able to Recall the Undercover Interview Questions 
Liars’ tendency to avoid incriminating information may make them also reluctant to talk 
about the undercover interview itself, and, consequently, during the formal interview liars may 
recall fewer questions that were asked during the undercover interview than truth tellers. A second 
explanation leads to the same outcome. Research has shown that regulation and suppression (which 
is in fact what liars do) have unintended consequences for cognitive functioning. Amongst other 
consequences, it leads to degraded memory (Richards, 2004). The most likely explanation for the 
effect of suppression on memory is that suppressors think more about their behaviour and the need 
to control it during a conversation than their counterparts (Richards, 2004). Thinking about 
behaviour and trying to control it is also what liars do (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; DePaulo et al., 
2003; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, Doering, 2010; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Granhag, 2010). Based on 
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liars’ tendency to avoid incriminating information and their possible degraded memory for having 
to lie during the undercover interview we predict that, compared to truth tellers, liars will be less 
able to recall the questions that have been asked during the undercover interview when they are 
explicitly asked about it in the subsequent formal interview (Hypothesis 3). 
Liars Will Affirm the Interviewer’s Expectations and Will Recall Fewer Unexpected Events 
Another consequence of liars’ tendency to avoid revealing information that they believe may 
be potentially incriminating is that they prefer to keep their answers simple (Granhag & Stromwall, 
2002). Elaborative answers may contain vital leads for investigators to verify or may result in 
investigators asking follow-up questions; something that liars often wish to avoid. Liars can also 
give relatively simple answers for cognitive reasons. It has been suggested that liars lack the 
imagination to come up with the detail of truth tellers’ accounts on the spot (Köhnken, 1996, 2004). 
Therefore one of the verbal differences that occur between truth tellers and liars is that liars’ stories are 
more stereotypical and contain fewer unexpected elements (Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hope, & 
Leal, 2012). Both explanations lead to the same predictions. In response to a leading question (one 
which could be adequately answered with a simple ‘yes’ response) in the undercover interview 
about their activities, we expect liars just to affirm the interviewer’s expectations whereas truth 
tellers may elaborate and also report other activities they engaged in (Hypothesis 4). Based on liars’ 
tendency to produce stereotypical answers we further predict truth tellers to recall more events that 
they deem to be ‘unexpected’ in the second interview than liars (Hypothesis 5). We predict truth 
tellers will spontaneously report (without prompting) more unexpected events than liars, but also 
when explicitly asked in the second interview whether anything unexpected had happened. To our 
knowledge this prompting of participants to recall unexpected events has not yet been explored in 
research. 
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Collective Interviewing 
Liars Will Ask Each Other Fewer Questions  
In real life people often commit crimes or reconnaissance missions in groups (Crenshaw, 
1990; Soufan, 2011). In the current study, participants carried out their mission in pairs. The 
participants were also interviewed in pairs (collective interviewing), both in the undercover 
interview and in the second interview. Interviewing the participants in pairs is entirely natural in the 
undercover interview as it would appear odd to separate apparent ‘members of the public’ for a 
seemingly innocuous survey about using the park. Interviewing potential suspects in pairs in the 
second interview is perhaps more unusual. However, this strategy has advantages. To date, two 
experiments have been published in which pairs of truth tellers and pairs of liars were interviewed 
collectively, and they both revealed differences in communication cues between the pairs of truth 
tellers and pairs of liars (Driskell, Salas, & Driskell, 2012; Vrij, Jundi et al., 2012). When pairs of 
truth tellers recall a jointly experienced event during an interview, they may communicate 
substantially with each other in an attempt to collectively recall all the details they know, and to 
correct each other’s stories. In this respect, Hollingshead (1998) refers to transaction information 
search; the idea that people in interpersonal relationships often have a specialised ‘division of 
labour’ with respect to encoding, storing, and retrieving information from different domains 
(Wegner, 1987). Truth tellers, having shared experience of an actual event, may naturally make use 
of this transactive memory by cuing one another, posing questions to one another, and verbalising 
connections asking each other questions that could tap into the other’s memory domain. In contrast, 
liars will not have a joint experience to recall. They may provide their prepared answers to 
anticipated questions, or if the questions were not anticipated, one person may take the lead and the 
other person may simply agree with what is said. This is a far less interactive approach than the 
truth tellers’ approach, and, indeed, in the two collective interviewing experiments to date, the pairs 
of liars made fewer additions, corrections and interruptions than the pairs of truth tellers (Driskell et 
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al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2012). 
Hollingshead’s (1998) transaction information search hypothesis also suggests that pairs of 
truth tellers will pose each other more questions than pairs of liars. Due to the nature of the 
interview format, this question has not been addressed in previous research. In the previous 
experiments the interviewer was the only person asking the questions, whereas the present 
experiment adapted an interview format  based on the timeline technique proposed by Hope, Mullis 
and Gabbert (2013), which enabled the interviewees to ask each other questions. After the interview 
the pairs of participants were instructed to collectively prepare a timeline reporting the activities 
they undertook as well as the duration of the activities. We observed the interaction between the 
pairs. Based on Hollingshead’s (1998) transaction information search we predict that truth tellers 
will ask each other more questions than liars (Hypothesis 6).  
Method 
Design and Participants 
A total of 96 participants (48 pairs) took part, including one pair that refused to speak to the 
undercover interviewer. That pair was subsequently dropped from the analyses. From the remaining 
94 participants, 29 (31%) were male, and their average age was M = 22.30 (SD = 4.73) years.  
Pairs of friends, partners or colleagues were recruited for the study and were offered a £10 
honorarium for participation. We recruited pairs who knew each other because this reflects real life 
situations: criminals acting together are likely to know each other well (Soufan, 2011). Each pair 
was randomly allocated to either the truth telling or lying condition. Truth tellers and liars were both 
instructed to complete tasks A, B and C, as detailed below. Tasks A and C differed between the two 
conditions and Task B (where the undercover interviewer intervened) was the same for both.  
 Mission: Truth tellers. Upon arrival, pairs of truth tellers (N = 24) were told that their 
mission was to conduct a ‘Visit Victoria Park’ campaign. This mission involved collecting material 
for a promotional flyer encouraging people to visit Victoria Park. The truth telling pairs were 
instructed to walk together to Victoria Park and take a number of still photographs and videos of a 
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large fountain (Task A). They were then instructed to take still photographs of animals in an animal 
enclosure in the park (Task B). For ethical reasons, in both Tasks A and B participants were 
instructed not to include any footage involving other park users, particularly children. 
Whilst at the rabbit section of the animal enclosure during Task B, the pair was approached 
by an undercover interviewer posing as a member of the city council. The interviewer was blind to 
the veracity condition of the pair. He asked if they were happy to participate in a survey about park 
usage. If they consented (all truth tellers did) he proceeded to ask them some questions. Before the 
survey he casually asked ‘Is it just the rabbits you are taking photos of?’ This question was asked in 
a conversational style so as not to appear pre-prepared. The survey included questions such as what 
routes they were taking to enter and exit the park, what they had done before the park visit and what 
they planned to do after it. There were some ‘filler’ questions included to help with the illusion of it 
being a park survey, e.g. ‘What is your favourite feature of the park?’ The undercover interviewer 
wore a surreptitious microphone to record all the participants’ answers. On completing the interview 
and photographing the animals, the pair walked to a meeting point to meet an experimenter who 
brought them back to the department via a previously specified route (Task C).  
 Mission: Liars. When pairs of liars (N= 23) arrived to take part in the experiment, they were 
told their mission was to partake in an ‘Animal Rights’ campaign. Their initial task (Task A) was to 
walk to a nearby department store and photograph the shop window. The rationale for this task was 
that the department store sells products that are tested on animals and that this would be highlighted 
in the campaign. Task B for liars was to then walk to Victoria Park and photograph the animals in 
the animal enclosure, in the same manner as truth tellers. Here, they were approached by the 
undercover interviewer when they were at the rabbit section as outlined above. Liars then went to a 
different meeting point to truth tellers to meet an experimenter who escorted them back to the 
department via a specific route which was entirely different to that which the truth tellers took (Task 
C). Liars were later instructed to say that they took the truth tellers’ routes to ensure that they indeed 
would be lying.  
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Before departing on their mission, the liars were given details of the truth tellers’ ‘Visit 
Victoria Park’ campaign and were instructed to use this as their cover-up story if anyone happened 
to speak to them whilst they were on their mission. They were given time to thoroughly look over 
details of the truth tellers’ mission to ensure it was well memorised. Truth tellers were instructed to 
report their true mission if anyone happened to speak to them whilst they were on their mission. 
 Truth Tellers and Liars: Post Mission. On returning to the department, all truth telling and 
lying participants were told that they were suspected of having been involved in an Animal Rights 
campaign whilst they were out. They were told that their task was to convince the interviewer that 
they were not involved in an Animal Rights campaign, but instead had been partaking in a ‘Visit 
Victoria Park’ campaign. Therefore, truth tellers could honestly report their Visit Victoria Park 
mission whereas liars needed to convince the interviewer that they had been undertaking the truth 
tellers’ mission described to them at the start of their mission. Participants were not told whether 
they would be interviewed separately or collectively. 
All participants were told that if they did not convince the interviewer they were telling the 
truth, they would not receive the £10 reward and instead would have to write a detailed statement 
about their activities during the mission. This was solely to motivate interviewees to be as 
convincing as possible; in actuality all participants were paid the £10 and none of them had to write 
a statement regardless of whether the interviewer believed them or not. 
All participants were given time to prepare for the interview as a pair. Truth tellers were 
advised to look over the photographs they had taken and to decide which of them would fit best into 
the campaign. They were also left with details of their original mission and the routes they had 
taken to ensure they remembered them clearly. Liars were also asked to check their photographs to 
determine those best for the ‘Visit Victoria Park’ campaign. They were given the details of the truth 
tellers’ campaign again to refresh their memory and instructed to study it thoroughly in order to be 
as convincing as possible.  
The experimenter left the room to allow the pair to prepare while unsupervised. After 10 
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minutes the experimenter returned to ask if they were ready. If not, they were allowed more time 
until they felt prepared for the interview. One pair of liars and one pair of truth tellers needed more 
than 10 minutes for their preparation. 
After this preparation time, the pairs were split up and individuals were each taken to 
separate rooms to complete a pre-interview questionnaire asking questions about their preparation, 
e.g., ‘Did you develop an interview strategy together with your friend?’ (Yes/No) They were also 
asked to rate on a 7 point Likert scale to what extent they had discussed with their friend what to 
say during the interview, from 0 (not at all) to 7 (thoroughly).  
After completing the questionnaire, pairs of participants were taken to the interview room to 
be interviewed together. They were informed that they would be audio and video recorded. The 
interviewer was blind as to the veracity condition of the participants. The interview was conducted 
in a formal information gathering style. Questions pertained to general, spatial or temporal 
information, based on a previous study (Vrij et al., 2009). First, interviewees were asked to describe 
in as much detail as possible what they had done during their mission. After this free narrative, 
more specific questions were asked focusing on the reasons the pair had gone to the park, what they 
had done there, the routes they had taken throughout, and what they would be able to see from the 
fountain and from the animal enclosure. They were also asked if they had spoken to anyone whilst 
on their mission and if so to describe the exchange. If they admitted to speaking to the undercover 
interviewer, they were asked what questions he had asked them and what their responses had been. 
Another question was whether anything unexpected had happened during the task. The interviewer 
addressed each participant as equally as possible in terms of eye gaze and avoided influencing who 
would respond to the question. 
Pairs were then asked to illustrate physically on a timeline how long each aspect of their task 
had taken. They were given a paper with a timeline (from 0 to 60 minutes) marked on it, and 
instructed to indicate what they had done and at what times in whichever manner they preferred (the 
resultant timelines were largely textual, pictorial or a combination). After the interview, pairs were 
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split up once more and the individuals were asked to complete a post interview questionnaire. This 
asked about how motivated they were to appear convincing on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
(1) not at all motivated to (7) extremely motivated. 
Finally, at the end of the study we asked 21 pairs of participants (8 pairs of truth tellers and 
13 pairs of liars) whether they thought at the time when they left Victoria Park that the undercover 
interviewer had been part of the study on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from (1) not at all to (7) 
definitely. 
Coding 
The undercover and formal interviews were transcribed and coded by one rater who was 
blind to the veracity status of the pairs. In these codings, the responses of the pairs rather than the 
individual participants who made up the pair were of interest (thus each interview resulted in one 
data point). There were eight dependent variables, one derived from the undercover interview and 
seven for the formal interview.  
A second coder coded variables 2, 3, 5 and 8 in all interviews (see below for definitions of 
these variables), and a random selection of 30% of the interviews for variables 1, 4, 6 and 7. The 
results indicate that the reliability of all dependent variables was satisfactory.(1) Overlap of content 
between the undercover and formal interviews was analysed on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
(1) no overlap to (7) almost identical content (intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) = .78). A 
middle range rating of 4 would denote approximately 50% identical content and the remainder 
completely distinct, e.g. ‘We came from King Henry building and then went straight to the fountain’, 
compared with ‘We came from King Henry building and then went round the park taking 
photographs of the various parts’. Each question in the formal interview was assessed as to whether 
participants mentioned the undercover interviewer, and the rater made a binary judgement of yes or 
no. Based on this we calculated  (2) whether or not the undercover interviewer was mentioned in 
response to the initial free response question (“Tell me in detail what happened during the mission”) 
(Cohen’s Kappa .95, inspection of the data showed one disagreement, an error made by one coder) 
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and (3) the total number of times the undercover interviewer was mentioned in the formal interview 
after the free recall (intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) .91, p = .000, scores of the coders were 
averaged). (4) From the formal interview transcripts, the rater also counted the number of questions 
the participants accurately recalled as having been asked in the covert interview (ICC = .92). (5) For 
the undercover interview, whether the participants said that they were just taking pictures of the 
rabbits or of rabbits but also other animals (dichotomous variable) was coded (Cohen’s Kappa .92). 
Inspection of the data showed that disagreement occurred on two occasions, due to vague answers 
by the participants. The two coders discussed these disagreements and reached a final decision. (6) 
The coder also noted the number of events that the participants reported as being unexpected when 
they were explicitly asked towards the end of the formal interview whether anything unexpected 
had happened to them (ICC = .94) (7) In addition, the coder noted the number of unexpected events 
that were spontaneously mentioned in response to the other questions in the formal interview. 
Examples of unexpected events were ‘camera not working’, ‘difficulty taking pictures of the 
fountain because there were too many people around’, and ‘difficulty taking pictures of the animals 
because they were in cages with bars’. Mentioning the undercover interviewer was not counted as 
an unexpected event as it was already counted in the ‘mentioning the undercover interviewer’ 
dependent variable (ICC = .86).  (8) The conversation the pair had whilst completing the timeline 
task was also analysed. The coder counted the total number of questions that they asked each other 
about the mission. Any questions or comments to the interviewer about how to complete the task 
were disregarded (ICC was .97, p = .000, scores of the coders were averaged). 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 Participants had an average rating of M = 5.38 (SD = 1.38) on the 7-point motivation scale 
which suggests that they were highly motivated to appear convincing. Although truth tellers were 
motivated (M = 4.97, SD = 1.51), liars rated themselves as more motivated (M = 5.80, SD = 1.09), 
F(1, 92) = 9.18, p = 0.003, d = 0.64. 
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Regarding the question about whether the participants thought that the undercover 
interviewer was part of the study, the average mean was M = 5.05 (SD = 2.22), with liars being 
somewhat (although not significantly) more certain (M = 5.46, SD = 2.00) than truth tellers (M = 
4.36, SD = 2.47), F(1, 19) = 2.26, p = 0.142, d = .49. A mean score of 5.05 means that, on average, 
participants reported to be ‘certain’ that the undercover interviewer was part of the study. Looking 
at how many participants indicated they were ‘absolutely certain’ that the covert investigator was 
part of the study (a score of 7 on the Likert scale), only 3 out of 21 pairs (15%) indicated this high 
degree of certainty. This means the vast majority of pairs (85%) had at least some doubts, even after 
the formal interview (when this question was asked). This suggests that the covert investigator 
manipulation was to some extent successful.   
Preparation 
When asked if they had developed a collaborative interview strategy with their friend, more 
liars (78%) than truth tellers (38%) claimed they had, χ2 (1, N = 94) = 15.97, p = .000, Phi = .41. 
Liars (M = 5.17, SD = 1.15) also rated their preparation discussions with each other concerning  
what to say during the interview as being more thorough than truth tellers (M = 4.58, SD = 1.22), F 
(1, 92) = 5.73, p = 0.019, d = 0.50.  
Correlations between the Responses to Questions in the Formal Interview 
 Table 9 presents the Pearson or Spearman correlations between the dependent variables 
examined in the formal interview. Some correlations are noteworthy. The number of times the 
undercover interviewer was mentioned in the free recall question correlated highly (r = 0.77) with 
the number of unexpected events spontaneously mentioned during the interview. This cannot be 
caused by double coding as mentioning the undercover interviewer was not counted as an 
unexpected event. It perhaps reflects the level of detail provided during the interview. That is, 
interviewees who provide a lot of detail may be both mentioning the undercover interviewer and 
reporting many unexpected events. Also, the number of unexpected events reported when prompted 
correlated highly (r = 0.59) with the number of questions the pairs of participants asked each other 
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during the timeline task, perhaps again reflecting the level of detail provided during the interview. 
Apart from these noteworthy correlations, most correlations were low which indicates that the set of 
dependent variables measured a range of responses from the interviewees.  
Table 9. Correlations between the Dependent Variables Measured in the Formal Interview for all 
participants 
 
 1 
Undercover 
interviewer 
mentioned 
in free 
recall 
2 
Undercover 
interviewer 
mentioned 
after the 
free recall 
3 
Number of 
undercover 
interviewer 
questions 
correctly 
recalled 
4 
Overlap 
between 
undercover 
and field 
interview 
5 
Number of 
unexpected 
events 
mentioned 
when 
prompted 
6 
Number of 
unexpected 
events 
spontaneous
ly reported 
7 
Number 
of 
questions 
asked in 
the 
timeline 
exercise 
1 1 .19 .22 .06 .25 .77** .20 
2  1 .15 .33* .44** .14 .40** 
3   1 .03 .14 .40** .26 
4    1 .01 .02 -.07 
5     1 .15 .59** 
6      1 .11 
7       1 
* p < .05  ** p < .01
 
Suspiciousness towards the Undercover Interviewer 
With regards to the suspiciousness of the participants towards the undercover interviewer, 
we carried out five ANOVAs utilising a 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Suspicion about undercover interviewer 
question asked) design with ‘Is it just the rabbits you are taking pictures of?’, ‘Overlap between un-
dercover and field interview’, ‘Undercover interviewer mentioned in the initial free recall’, ‘Under-
cover interviewer mentioned after the free recall’ and ‘Number of undercover interviewer recalled’ 
as dependent variables. None of the main effects for the question about the undercover interviewer 
(all F values < 3.15, all d values > .08) or interaction effects (all F values < 1.24, all p values > .27) 
were significant, suggesting that their suspiciousness did not have an impact on these results.  
Hypotheses Testing 
To test the hypotheses, two sets of analyses were conducted. Chi-square tests were carried 
out on the two dichotomous variables (taking photographs of the rabbits; and mentioning the 
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undercover interviewer in the initial free recall question) and ANOVAs on the remaining six 
variables. The statistical information for the Chi-square tests is reported in the text whereas the 
statistical information for the univariate tests is reported in Table 10.  
We found support for all six hypotheses. Overlap between responses in the undercover and 
formal interviews was less for liars than for truth tellers (Table 10, Hypothesis 1). When asked in 
the initial free recall question in the formal interview to give a detailed account of the mission, more 
pairs of truth tellers (42%) than pairs of liars (9%) mentioned the undercover interviewer, χ2  (1, N = 
46) = 7.72, p = 0.005, Phi  =.40 (Hypothesis 2). Also after the free recall, truth tellers mentioned the 
undercover interviewer more often than liars did (Table 10, Hypothesis 2). 
When asked in the formal interview which questions have been asked in the informal 
interview, liars recalled marginally fewer correct questions than truth tellers (Table 10, Hypothesis 
3). In the undercover interview conducted in the park, in response to the question ‘Is it just the 
rabbits you’re taking photos of?’ significantly more liars (87%) than truth tellers (48%) said “yes”, 
χ2 (1, N = 46) = 8.43, p = 0.004, Phi = .42 (Hypothesis 4). The remaining truth tellers also 
mentioned other animals. 
In response to the formal interview question ‘Did anything unexpected happen at all during 
your task?’, truth tellers mentioned more unexpected events than liars. Truth tellers also 
spontaneously mentioned more unexpected events in the remaining part of the formal interview 
than liars (Table 10, Hypothesis 5). In the discussion about the timeline task, truth tellers asked each 
other more questions than liars, consistent with Hypothesis 6 (Table 10). 
To examine what proportion of the sample could be accurately categorised based on the 
variables listed in Table 10, we carried out six separate discriminant analyses for each variable. 
Consistent with the pattern emerging in the Chi-square analyses reported above, liars were more 
accurately classified than truth tellers on each occasion. In fact, in this experiment truth tellers were 
often classified at chance levels. The discriminant functions for interviewer’s questions recalled, 
χ2(1) = 3.76, Wilk's Lambda = .92, p =. 052, and spontaneous mentioning of unexpected events, 
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χ2(1) = 3.75, Wilk's Lambda = .92, p =. 053 were not significant, but the discriminant functions for 
overlap, χ2(1) = 6.64, Wilk's Lambda = .86, p =. 01, undercover interviewer mentioned, χ2(1) = 4.86, 
Wilk's Lambda = .90, p =. 028, mentioning of unexpected events after prompting, χ2(1) = 8.18, 
Wilk's Lambda = .83, p =. 004, and timeline, χ2(1) = 10.69, Wilk's Lambda = .79, p = .001 were. 
The most effective variable veracity classification was the timeline task, on the basis of which 71% 
of truth tellers and 87% of liars were accurately classified. 
Table 10. The Participants’ Responses in the Formal Interview as a Function of Veracity 
 Truth Lie    Veracity 
Classification 
 M SD M SD F(1, 45) p d Truth  Lie 
Overlap between 
undercover and 
field interview 
3.00 1.87 1.73 1.32 7.24 .010 0.79 58% 83% 
Undercover 
interviewer 
mentioned after 
free recall 
2.22 0.67 1.63 .93 6.17 .017 0.74 46% 78% 
No. of undercover 
interviewer 
questions recalled 
4.42 2.02 3.38 1.49 3.97 .052 0.59 67% 57% 
No. of 
unexpected 
events reported 
when prompted 
1.65 1.09 0.82 0.78 9.09 .004 0.88 50% 87% 
No. of 
unexpected 
events reported 
spontaneously  
1.08 1.91 0.26 0.54 3.96 .053 0.67 50% 78% 
No of questions 
asked in the 
timeline task 
10.68 5.97 5.48 4.00 12.22 .001 1.04 71% 87% 
 
Discussion 
Undercover Interviewing 
Overlap between responses in the undercover and formal interviews was less for liars than 
for truth tellers (Hypothesis 1). Previous research has found that liars tend to use a ‘repeat what I 
have said before’ strategy (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999), which would suggest that there should be 
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greater overlap with liars than with truth tellers. However, there are a few reasons why we did not 
expect this to happen in the present experiment. Firstly, a repeat strategy will occur only if the 
interviewee believes that the two interviews are linked, which was not the case in this experiment. 
Secondly, even if the interviewees suspected that the interviews were linked, we used different 
interviewers in both interviews. The results suggest that liars chose to tailor their answers in the 
second interview to what they believed sounded convincing to the second interviewer - rather than 
to ensure the answers showed overlap with their answers during the first interview. Thirdly, 
although the questions referred to the same event in both interviews, they were purposefully 
phrased differently, and liars may have lacked the cognitive flexibility required to adequately 
identify the similarities and address both sets of question in the same way.  
Our findings and those from Granhag and Strömwall (1999) combined reveals a complex 
picture regarding the relationship between deception and consistency. There is a strong belief 
amongst lay persons and professionals that liars are more inconsistent than truth tellers (Strömwall, 
Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004; Vrij, Akehurst, & Knight, 2006). However, this will only be the case if liars 
do not execute their ‘repeat what I have said before’ strategy (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999). As 
demonstrated in the present experiment, interviewers can actively discourage liars from using such a 
strategy by making the link between interviews less apparent, through changing the format in which 
the questions were asked. This results in liars making shorter term credibility-based decisions in 
apparently unrelated interviews. Without specific interventions from the investigator aimed at 
discouraging liars to use their ‘repeat’ strategy, we expect liars to use this strategy and avoid the 
inconsistencies that investigators expect them to make.  
Truth tellers mentioned the undercover interviewer more than liars (Hypothesis 2). This is 
interesting as parallel work on alibi preparation has shown that ‘innocents’ report planning to 
mention potential witnesses for their alibi (Nahari, Vrij & Fisher, 2012). In contrast, liars prefer not 
to be linked with incriminating evidence – this is termed the ‘avoid or escape’ strategy (Granhag & 
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Hartwig, 2008). This strategy perhaps accounts for why most liars in the current study (91%) 
avoided mentioning the undercover interviewer, who could potentially act as a witness to their 
actions. In fact, photographing the animals at the animal enclosure was part of the truth tellers’ 
mission too. Having been informed of the truth tellers’ mission, liars were aware of this and so 
could have plausibly used the undercover interviewer to provide an alibi. The fact that they did not 
suggests that the ‘avoid or escape’ strategy exerted a stronger effect over them, compelling them to 
distance themselves from the information. Further evidence of the fact that liars distance themselves 
from potentially incriminating information was that liars were marginally less able to recall the 
questions asked by the undercover interviewer than truth tellers (Hypothesis 3). This finding could 
also be the result of degraded memory of the undercover interview (Richards, 2004), due to the fact 
that liars may have been pre-occupied or distracted with the effort of lying during that interview. 
Truth tellers were more likely than liars to report that they took photos of animals other than 
rabbits (Hypothesis 4); an indication that the liars wanted to keep their answers simple, a preferred 
strategy amongst liars (Granhag & Stromwall, 2002). Liars may have reasoned that replying that 
they also took pictures of other animals would have elicited more questions from the interviewer, 
which could potentially have resulted in them revealing incriminating information. The preference 
to keep it simple, as well as a lack of imagination, may be the reason why liars reported fewer 
unexpected events both spontaneously and, as measured in this experiment for the first time, when 
prompted (Hypothesis 5). The finding that differences emerged between truth tellers and liars in 
mentioning unexpected events when being prompted to recall such events has important implications. 
Although it has been found more often that truth tellers report more unexpected information than liars 
(Vrij, 2005, 2008), a disadvantage of this cue is that truth tellers often do not spontaneously recall 
unexpected events either. This may in part be caused by their expectations. If conversation partners do 
not know each other well, which is the case in most formal interview settings, interviewees tend to 
give short, to the point answers (Fisher, 2010; Fisher, Milne, & Bull, 2011). It could be that truth 
tellers have experienced unexpected events but choose not to report them because they believe them 
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to be trivial or irrelevant. Prompting about such information may stimulate truth tellers to report 
them, and liars could well lack the imagination and cognitive ability to match reporting the same 
number of unexpected events as truth tellers. 
The present experiment demonstrates that undercover interviewing can be used to not only 
establish evidence but also to identify a potentially deceptive individual via between interview 
comparisons. In this experiment the second interview was a formal interview. Such an interview is 
appropriate if investigators believe that they have enough evidence against the suspect to start a 
formal investigation. In other real life settings conducting a formal interview may be undesirable. In 
such cases the second interview could also be an undercover interview or another more informal 
interview setting. Carrying out a second undercover interview may be disadvantageous in that the 
undercover interviewer cannot ask many and/or detailed questions because this may make the sus-
pect wary. Whether short undercover interviews can yield the same effects as the formal interview 
employed in the present experiment is an empirical question worth examining. 
Collective Interviewing 
Truth tellers asked each other more questions than liars during the time line task (Hypothesis 
6) which supports Hollingshead’s (1998) transaction information search hypothesis. The two collec-
tive interviewing experiments published to date (Driskell et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2012) revealed that 
truth tellers interact more with each other spontaneously than liars. This experiment revealed that 
they also do this when prompted. The benefit of prompting is that interviewers take control of the 
interview setting and in doing so can initiate techniques that elicit differences in the transactional 
information search between truth tellers and liars.  
The ‘asking each other questions’ variable resulted in the correct classification of more truth 
tellers (71%) and liars (87%) than any other dependent variable in the present experiment. These 
high percentages indicate a strong effect, but they need to be treated with caution. The correct clas-
sifications are based on between-subjects comparisons whereby the score of each individual in the 
sample is compared with the scores of the other individuals in the sample. However, in such com-
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parisons the cut-off point cannot be determined beforehand. That is, we can predict that liars will 
ask each other fewer questions than truth tellers but cannot predict the maximum number of ques-
tions liars will ask. In real life, investigators would need such information to make veracity judge-
ments. A possible solution is the development of within-subject lie detection tools that allow for in-
dividual idiosyncrasies whereby the responses in a given situation are compared with the responses 
in a comparable situation in which the respondent is known to be truthful. A change in responses is 
more likely to occur in liars than in truth tellers and change scores could then be used to establish 
veracity. Within-subjects lie detection tools exist; for example the Concealed Information Test poly-
graph test (Lykken, 1959, 1960), but are more the exception than the rule in deception research.  
 Future research could examine reasons for the collective interviewing effect beyond the 
transaction information search hypothesis. For example, since more liars than truth tellers devel-
oped a collaborative interview strategy, liars could have had less reason to communicate with each 
other. To test this hypothesis, collaboration between the pair in preparation of an interview could be 
monitored in future research and correlated with interactive communication during the interview.  
Interviewing suspects individually is standard protocol in formal forensic settings, and there 
are various reasons for this. Investigators may believe that they will find more inconsistencies in the 
answers from pairs of liars than pairs of truth tellers (Inbau et al., 2013). They may also believe that 
they can set up one interviewee against the other if they interview the pair members separately, or 
they may simply never have considered collective interviewing. Future research could compare the 
efficacy of individual and collective interviewing for detecting deceit.  
Interviewing collectively can be entirely acceptable if such interviews take place in non-
traditional investigative settings such as in parks, shopping malls, sport venues, security check 
points, airports and other border controls. People are often in small groups in such places and sepa-
rating them can be time consuming, cause unnecessary aggravation and lead to uncooperative inter-
viewees. Investigators may be reluctant to use the collective interviewing technique in such settings 
but we believe that their reluctance should not be guided by fear that such interviews fail to reveal 
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cues to deceit.  Although the current study examined collective interviewing amongst pairs, the 
technique is not limited to pairs and could be used with groups of more than two individuals. Future 
research could examine how efficient collective interviewing is in these situations.  
Final Thoughts 
The present experiment demonstrated that investigators can elicit diagnostic cues to deceit 
via specific interview protocols. We elicited the cues ‘mentioning unexpected events’, ‘inconsisten-
cy’ and the communication cue ‘asking each other questions’. As such, this experiment fits well in 
the new wave of research on ‘interviewing to detect deception’. The core of this new research para-
digm is that the deceptive cues liars display spontaneously are weak and unreliable. Interviewers 
therefore should have an active role and enhance and elicit such cues via specific interview proto-
cols. See Vrij (in press), Vrij, Granhag and Porter (2010), Vrij and Granhag (2012a, b) and Vrij and 
Verschuere (in press) for recent reviews. 
For many of our findings we have offered several potential explanations, but the extent to 
which each explanation contributed to the finding is quantitatively immeasurable. This should not 
be deemed problematic; a finding that can be explained in multiple ways is more likely to be robust, 
which we consider advantageous. Future studies should seek to measure the relative impact of dif-
ferent factors on the findings obtained in this experiment.  
There are some important procedural and methodological factors to consider. Truth tellers 
and liars undertook different activities, a common feature in deception studies. Although it may cre-
ate a confound (truth tellers and liars undertake different activities), it is the favourite paradigm in 
deception research as it reflects real life. In reality outright lies (e.g., total fabrications) are the most 
common lies people tell (67% of lies are outright lies according to a diary study examining lies told 
in daily life, DePaulo et al., 1996) and innocent suspects often have undertaken different activities 
and been involved in distinct circumstances to guilty suspects. As such, the results have robust eco-
logical validity. 
When examining undercover interviewing, participants who are sent out on a mission may 
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well expect something to happen during that mission that is not explicitly detailed in their briefing. 
To ensure that they stay in their experimental role if approached and questioned (either by an 
experimenter or an incidental encounter with some other member of the public) it is important to 
require them to ‘stay in role’, otherwise they may simply respond that they are partaking in an 
experiment. Sceptics may think that participants will always believe that people who approach them 
are part of the experiment but evidence suggests that this is not the case. Many participants in Vrij, 
Mann, Jundi et al. (2012) did not realise that the undercover interviewer was part of the study, and 
also in this experiment we succeeded in creating some doubt in many participants. Of course, the 
degree of suspicion is naturally dependent on how convincing the undercover interviewer is. The 
‘set-up’ in the current study was realistic to the extent that it is entirely plausible that someone from 
the City Council might conduct a survey concerning the use of a local public park. Of course, 
undercover interviews in real life may be easier to conduct because interviewees may not expect 
them to happen.  
Not all pairs were asked about to what extent they believed the park interviewer to be part 
of the experiment (when they were leaving the park). This is because the first few participants to 
partake in the study were simply asked in general to what extent they believed that the interviewer 
was part of the experiment. However as this was asked after the formal interview, we realised that 
they may have had time to process the circumstances and could now be more suspicious of the 
undercover interviewer than they were initially. An alternative option, to ask the question after the 
mission and before the interview, could have made the pairs suspicious that the undercover 
interviewer was part of the experiment- something we felt important to avoid. We therefore decided 
with the remaining participants to ask the question after the interview but qualified the point of time 
when they may or may not have considered him to be part of the experiment (i.e. as they were 
leaving the park).  
Despite the doubt we created in many participants, on average participants indicated that 
they were ‘certain’ that the undercover interviewer was part of the study. This may make our find-
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ings more impressive, because one would think that if liars suspected that the undercover interview 
was part of the mission, they would be more inclined to mention the undercover interview during 
the formal interview, or would be more inclined to accurately recall questions from that interview. 
The study method complements the PEACE model with its non accusatory, information 
gathering style. Indeed the PEACE approach involves the discussion of details that later can be used 
to incriminate a suspect, and so does undercover interviewing to establish evidence. As such, 
undercover interviewing may in some circumstances become an additional tool in the PEACE box. 
In sum, these findings provide further evidence that the undercover interviewing and 
collective interviewing techniques are promising tools to detect deception. We believe that they 
have potential to be invaluable in interviewing settings outside formal police interviews, and hope 
that this article will stimulate thinking and research in this important but neglected area.  
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Part V: General Discussion 
Chapter 8: General Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
The aim of this thesis was to explore whether covert and collective interviewing can provide 
effective, observable cues to deceit. Participants were either interviewed covertly by an undercover 
agent, interviewed in pairs, or a combination of both. Each experiment involved participants 
conducting a different task, however all had the premise of liars conducting a form of simulated 
criminal or terrorist activity. When interviewed, either covertly or formally, liars were asked to use 
the truth tellers' story as their alibi. This ensured that differences observed could be plausibly 
attributed to veracity, and not to differing story content. Participants were not explicitly told that 
they would be interviewed covertly prior to it occurring, however they were asked to always stick to 
their cover story should anyone speak to them. 
Throughout this chapter, the terms 'covert' and 'undercover' will be used interchangeably 
to refer to the manner of interviewing suspects without explicitly informing them that a law 
enforcement interview is being conducted. 
In Experiment 1, participants were covertly interviewed about their plans for an 
upcoming trip. Interviews were short; involving five questions in total. Participants were either 
actual tourists about to visit the Isle of Wight, or liars briefed to find a suitable place to plant a 
decoy device to cause disruption. Findings indicated significant verbal differences in truth tellers’ 
and liars’ responses, where liars used more hedges, hesitations and confirmations in their speech 
than truth tellers. Liars also mentioned less times, less activities, and were less accurate than truth 
tellers when marking their destination on a map. Liars were less willing to be photographed than 
truth tellers. 
Covert interviewing can be a complex paradigm to introduce into real world settings, as 
the questioning style should encourage interviewees to talk and avoid raising their suspicion. Trying 
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to incorporate questions that detect possible criminal intent into a seemingly everyday conversation 
has the potential of sounding stilted and artificial, thus signalling the interviewer's real intentions. 
For example, asking people to recall their experienced events in reverse order provides cues to 
deceit (Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne & Bull, 2008), but this would not feature in a typical 
everyday conversation. In terms of detecting deceit in intention, asking people to describe imagined 
events in sensory detail (i.e. including sights and smells) provides cues to veracity (Warmelink, Vrij, 
Mann, Jundi, & Granhag, 2012), but again may seem awkward in an everyday conversation. In our 
experiment not only was the covert interview effective in eliciting cues to deceit, but 46% of liars 
did not realise that the undercover interview was part of the experiment. This is especially 
impressive when considering that during their instructions they were informed as to how to act 'if 
anyone happened to approach them', which may have therefore primed them to expect to be 
intercepted.  
The findings from Experiment 1 would be even more applicable in real world settings if 
it transpired that the differences elicited could be observable without formal coding and analysis. 
This is important as the ultimate aim of a covert investigator is to assess whether the interviewee 
poses grounds for suspicion – and if so immediate action may be warranted depending on the 
severity of the situation. So in Experiment 2, a lie detection study was carried out in order to 
determine whether these differences could be identified by lay observers. Each observer was given 
transcripts of 8 interviews in Experiment 1, and judged whether they seemed to be from a truthful or 
deceptive interviewee. So each transcript was assessed more than once. Observers could correctly 
determine veracity significantly better than chance level. They correctly identified truthful 
interviewees at a rate of 64.02%, which was above chance. Deceptive interviewees were correctly 
identified at a rate of 56.82% which was also above chance.  In addition participants rated 53.60% 
of all responses as truthful, which differed significantly from chance. The latter finding indicates a 
truth bias. However law enforcement officers may be less likely than lay observers to exhibit a truth 
bias. Indeed Meissner and Kassin (2002) demonstrated that an effect on response bias such that 
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training and prior experience of investigators increased the likelihood of delivering a verdict of 
'deceit' as opposed to 'truth.' This is termed the 'investigator bias'. This could, however be influenced 
by the nationality of the investigator. When exploring the behaviour of UK investigators for 
example, no such bias was identified (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004, 2006; Vrij, Mann, Robbins, & 
Robinson, 2006). A possible explanation for this difference is the importance given to interpreting 
nonverbal behaviour. In the US more emphasis is given to spot non verbal cues to deceit than in the 
UK (Vrij, 2008). Since the non verbal cues officers pay attention to are all cues to deceit rather than 
a mixture of cues to deceit or truthfulness, it means that the presence of such cues is interpreted as a 
sign of deceit whereas the absence of such cues is not necessarily seen as a sign of truthfulness. A 
lie bias is likely to be the result. 
A key advantage of Experiment 1 was the length of the undercover interview. In real 
world settings, investigators will have limited time for conversation before they will need to make a 
judgement, as lengthy interviews could arouse suspicion or simply result in the interviewees 
leaving. Experiment 3 tested another style of short undercover interview. Participants were 
despatched on a mission to take photographs, and when they completed this were approached by a 
mime artist who asked them if they had photographed him and if he could see the photos. Truth 
tellers were more likely than liars to admit to having photographed him, and to allow him to see the 
photos. When analysing the photos, truth tellers’ photographs were more open, appealing, included 
more people, and central than liars’ photographs. Suspicious features were more prominent in liars' 
photos and liars mentioned them more frequently. Here, the contents of photographs can be used as 
evidence to inform the interview. 
Proceeding to test the collective interviewing manipulation in Experiment 4a, suspects 
were interviewed in pairs about their recent activities. Truth tellers had lunch in a nearby restaurant, 
whereas liars were asked to 'steal' money from a purse but claim that they were having lunch at the 
time. Their eye gaze patterns were analysed and they were asked about the strategies they 
employed. Results showed that liars looked at the interviewer more, and exhibited less gaze 
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aversion than truth tellers. More liars than truth tellers developed a strategy prior to the interview. 
Truth tellers stated they did not prepare a strategy as they found it unnecessary, or they used a 'tell 
them how it was' strategy. This is an example of the illusion of transparency (Gilovich, Satsky & 
Medvic, 1998) in which truth tellers believe their innocence will be apparent. This effect is 
replicated in later studies as described below. Liars however used strategies to be convincing and to 
maintain eye contact with the interviewer. 
The verbal behaviour of suspects being collectively interviewed in Experiment 4b was 
analysed. Truth tellers interrupted each other more, corrected each other more, and added more 
information to each other’s accounts than liars. This demonstrates how pairs of truth tellers 
collectively recall information by communicating with one another. In the case of liars however, 
there is little or no collective experience that they wish to convey together to the interviewer, and 
thus these patterns of communication (interrupting and correcting each other and adding more to 
each other's accounts) is not observed. 
In Experiment 5, a combination study involving undercover and collective interviewing 
was employed. Participants undertook a study in pairs, and were interviewed covertly and formally 
in pairs. Results showed that liars had less overlap than truth tellers when their responses in the 
covert interview were compared to their responses in the formal interview. Liars were also less 
likely than truth tellers to mention the undercover interviewer in the formal interview, even though 
the period at which he was encountered was part of the truth tellers’ story (and therefore a plausible 
part of the liars’ alibi) as well. This complements Experiment 3, in which evidence is established to 
later inform an interview. 
The strategies of participants in Experiment 3 and Experiment 5 were then analysed. In 
Experiment 3, no differences between veracity with regard to strategies were found. We compared 
this to Experiments 4a and 5, in which differences between strategies were identified. A key 
discrepancy was the interview format, as in Experiment 3 participants were solely asked about the 
photographs they had taken, whereas in Experiments 4a and 5 they were questioned about a range 
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of activities they had participated in e.g. routes travelled and people spoken to. Another unique 
factor of Experiment 3 was that they were only asked about their strategies after the interview had 
taken place, whereas in Experiments 4a and 5 participants were also given pre interview 
questionnaires which asked them to detail their strategies. It is possible that questioning participants 
about their strategies prior to an interview encourages them to think about strategies, which then 
affects the strategies devised and used during the interview. 
Analysis of Experiment 5 demonstrated significant differences in the individual and 
collaborative strategies formed by liars and truth tellers. Again truth tellers stated they would just 
'tell the truth', replicating the findings from Experiment 4a. Liars however stated they would focus 
on working together to answer the questions. 
The thesis demonstrates continued support for truth tellers exhibiting the Illusion of 
Transparency, which is the tendency to assume their innocence will be apparent to observers. This is 
manifested through less truth tellers than liars forming a strategy (as found in Experiment 4a and 5), 
and in more truth tellers and liars using a strategy to 'just tell the truth', which was also apparent in 
Experiments 4a and 5. 
Continued support is also found for the tendency of liars to employ an 'avoid or escape' 
strategy (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). This involves them distancing themselves from anything they 
deem to be potentially incriminating. It is demonstrated in Experiment 5 in which liars avoided 
mentioning the undercover interview even though he formed part of their alibi, and in Experiment 5 
in which liars were more reluctant than truth tellers to allow the mime artist to see their photographs.  
According to Francis (2012), in psychology, experimental replication is crucial for 
establishing validity in empirical findings. We suggest that the replications we have found within 
this thesis demonstrate that our replicated results are robust. It also suggests that the findings are 
independent of the factors that pertained to each individual experiment e.g. demographic of 
participants and the tasks they were asked to do. If the findings were dependent on these factors, 
later studies in which these criteria were modified would not have generated the replications 
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observed. 
 
Real world applications 
With counter terrorism measures being of paramount importance in current law 
enforcement, both paradigms tested i.e. undercover and collective interviewing are particularly 
pertinent. Under Section 44 of the terrorism act, people and vehicles can be stopped and searched 
by authorities 'where a senior police officer who reasonably suspects an act of terrorism will take 
place authorises its use in circumstances where the powers are considered necessary' (Terrorism Act, 
2000). When stopping a vehicle, the passengers are asked questions first to determine whether they 
are suspicious or not. In these situations there may be one interviewer and several suspects, and so 
collective interviewing techniques will be appropriate. Employing the collective interviewing 
techniques described can effectively elicit cues to deceit. This is not only appropriate in counter 
terrorist measures, but also in situations such as border control, or when stopped by traffic officials 
for erratic driving. Recent research has also found cues to deceit when interviewing couples about 
the legitimacy of their relationship, which could be effective in identifying sham marriages. 
Analysis was conducted to determine whether the pair engaged in behaviours such as turn taking 
when responding to questions. When forced to turn-take, truth telling pairs were more able to 
continue on from each other's accounts, whereas lying pairs were more likely to repeat what their 
partner said before continuing (Vernham, Vrij, Mann, Leal & Hillman, under review). This 
complements the findings from Experiment 4b in which truth tellers added more information to 
each other's accounts than liars. 
Our collective interviewing results suggest that indeed interviewing more than one 
suspect at once can effectively elicit cues to deceit. These are important findings as current police 
practice dictates that suspects be separated immediately when being brought in for questioning. 
However interactions before the suspects have been separated can be analysed. For example prior to 
arrest if suspects are approached as a group, their intra-communication can be examined. This could 
 108 
                                                                                                                                                                  
be the deciding factor for investigators who are unsure as to whether to bring a pair or group in for 
questioning or not. 
The key advantage of using techniques of undercover and collective interviewing is that 
they can be used to determine a person's intentions, i.e. before any illegal activity has actually taken 
place. Prior to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, research on criminal and terrorist intentions was scarce, 
possibly because researchers underestimated its importance. It has since been investigated further, 
e.g. Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Jundi, & Granhag (2012) found that liars gave less details than truth 
tellers in response to unexpected questions about their upcoming trip. As policing duties tend to be 
required around reacting to crimes that have been committed (Homel & Clark, 1994), police suspect 
interviews are often about past activities. Areas in which more of a preventative approach is used 
include counter terrorism, counter espionage and border control. Intelligence agencies and defence 
centres may therefore benefit from using the interviewing techniques identified. Police may benefit 
from looking at criminal intentions too, to prevent crimes before they happen. Granhag (2010) 
presented a case for law enforcement officers to incorporate detecting deceptive intentions into their 
work. 
Undercover and collective interviewing could be appropriate in military situations, in 
which the agents are involved in the interviewing of subjects, the questioning of prisoners, and the 
vetting of those who may provide information of operational or intelligence value. Collective 
interviewing may be of use in situations where there are large numbers of people to interview. 
Undercover interviewing may take place in the field, particularly in areas of high threat where the 
interviewer needs to ascertain whether the person is friendly or hostile. 
 
Limitations 
A limitation of the thesis is the stakes at hand in the experiments. High-stakes situations 
involve large positive consequences of being believed or large negative consequences of not being 
believed (Mann & Vrij, 2008). High stakes lies can be accompanied by powerful emotions (ten 
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Brinke & Porter, 2011), which may not have been triggered during the studies in this thesis. 
Throughout these studies, the most a participant had to lose was a £10 cash reward. Whilst we hope 
that in a participant pool largely consisting of students that this may have instilled a degree of 
motivation, we acknowledge that in a police interview the stakes may be as grievous as a lifetime in 
prison, or, in some countries' jurisdictions, the death penalty. These levels of negative stakes cannot 
be ethically instilled in a laboratory setting, which may account for why to date there is a scarcity of 
published high stakes deception research (Porter, 2010). Studies of high-stakes liars, where the 
behaviour of suspects of murder, rape and arson in police interviews have been examined,  have 
revealed, however, that their behaviour is similar to that of low-stakes liars (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 
2002; Mann & Vrij, 2008). For example, in lab based studies liars typically display fewer 
movements than truth tellers (Vrij, 2004), and so did these suspects in their police interviews. Vrij 
& Granhag (2012) argue that high stakes situations will affect both truth tellers and liars to a 
heightened degree, as they all have more to lose in these circumstances. So the magnitude of 
differences between truth tellers and liars in high stakes situations may in fact be comparable to that 
in low stakes situations. 
Another factor to consider is the opportunity samples through which we recruited 
participants for our studies. Advertising on posters and internal university websites resulted in 
samples that consisted largely of staff and students at the university. Whether this population has a 
mindset that is representative of that of terrorists is questionable. According to Russell and Miller 
(1977), terrorists are likely to be between the ages of 22 and 25 years old, single, left wing males, 
from middle-to upper-class with some university education backgrounds. When looking at the 
population demographics from our experiments, a large proportion of our participants are male and 
between the ages of 22 and 25, and all have some university education. Future research could ask 
questions to determine their political views, class and relationship status. One may argue that 
profiles of terrorists could have changed since 1977, however the 2009 attempt to detonate a bomb 
on a US plane was carried out by a 23 year old male student from a UK university. Vrij (2004) 
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states that the average university student differs from the average suspect in a police interview in 
that students are on average more intelligent that suspects in police interviews (Gudjonsson, 2003) 
and this difference might affect how they lie (Ekman & Frank, 1993). But although the typical 
police suspect may be less intelligent than the average student, the typical terrorist may not be as the 
crimes they plan to commit are generally more grievous, more complex and of a larger scale. In a 
study comparing the demographics of male and female terrorists, the majority of female terrorists 
were found to be less than 35 years old, employed, educated to at least secondary level, and rarely 
involved in criminality (Jacques & Taylor, 2013). Many of the students used in our experiments 
share these traits. 
Another possibility that may need to be accounted for is that in real life, the people 
being interviewed may themselves be spies or experienced conmen, who may have had the 
experience of legal interviews before. Former FBI agent Navarro (2012) states that interviewing 
trained intelligence officers is very different from interviewing university students, as students 
typically have not had to live their lives by lying, and so have not mastered deceit in the same 
manner as conmen. However research conducted using military personnel and police as participants 
resulted in findings similar to those generated when using students, suggesting that they are not 
necessarily better or different liars to students (Vrij, Leal, Mann & Fisher, 2012; Vrij, Leal, Mann & 
Granhag, 2011; Vrij, Leal, Mann, Warmelink, Granhag & Fisher, 2010).  
Limitations of Collective Interviewing 
A key consideration when interviewing suspects collectively, is that of memory 
distortion or conformity. Research has demonstrated that witnesses who discuss an event with 
others often integrate misinformation from the discussion into their memory of the event, and this is 
particularly pronounced with discussions with co-witnesses (Gabbert, Memon & Allan, 2003; 
Paterson, Kemp & Ng, 2011). A real life example of this occurred when a Swedish foreign minister 
was murdered. Immediately after the crime had been committed, witnesses were placed in a room 
together to await interview. They discussed the scene with each other whilst in the room. When 
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leaving the room, the descriptions the witnesses gave about the perpetrator were influenced by each 
other. The perpetrator was caught on camera and did not match the descriptions that the 
eyewitnesses provided (Gabbert, Wright, Memon, Skagerberg & Jamieson, 2012). Misinformed, or 
false memories may be of an even greater concern to law enforcement officials than outright lies, as 
people often believe their false memories are true (Laney & Loftus, 2008). In these instances people 
do not display the verbal and non verbal cues that liars are susceptible to (von Hippel & Trivers, 
2011) as they are convinced that they themselves are telling the truth. So if memory distortion was 
occurring within our collective interviews, it would be virtually undetectable. Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (FMRi) has been suggested as a method of detecting false memories, as the 
medial temporal lobes of the brain show more activity when someone is recollecting a true memory, 
whereas the frontoparietal region shows more activity with the recollection of a false memory (Kim 
& Cabeza, 2007). In addition, research has demonstrated an association between speaking order and 
memory conformity, in that people who speak first in a discussion are misled less often than people 
who do not (Hewitt, Kane & Garry, 2013). Further research into memory conformity amongst 
collective interviewees may be required, to determine if their accounts become less accurate than if 
they were interviewed individually. Memory conformity may be more pronounced in truth tellers 
than in liars, as liars are generating a lie rather than recalling an episodic event that will be 
susceptible to memory distortion. 
In Experiment 5, a common strategy for both truth tellers and liars was to let one person 
do the talking and lead the conversation. In these instances it is likely that the person nominated to 
speak was the more dominant in status – however this could be empirically investigated in future 
research to confirm. If the dominant person does indeed talk more than the other, this could perhaps 
make lying easier for the pair as the dominant person can then answer the more difficult questions, 
and the subordinate can simply agree. Interviewers can prevent this by indicating who will answer 
which question. They could also use 'forced turn taking', whereby the interviewer dictates which 
pair member begins answering the question, and then enforces a swapping system whereby the 
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interviewees take turns to add to the answer. This will mean each member talks, regardless of status, 
and the content of their speech can be examined. Recent studies have begun to explore the method 
of turn taking, though so far equal status amongst pair members has been assumed (Vernham, Vrij, 
Mann, Leal & Hillman, under review).  
When interviewing groups, some members may be innocent whereas others may indeed 
warrant further investigation. In this thesis groups were either truth tellers or liars, but when 
interviewing in real world settings one would need to be aware that the situation will not always be 
that clear cut. The degree of guilt, or indeed guilty knowledge, may be on a scale with some group 
members knowing more than others. It may be worth exploring empirically how groups react when 
some members are guilty but others are not, and how reactions differ when the innocent members 
are or are not aware that some are guilty.   
 
Limitations of Covert Interviewing 
In our initial covert interviewing experiment, liars and truth tellers had different agendas 
with regards to how they had (or had not) been told to behave. In the ‘Can I take your Picture’ 
(Experiment 1) study for example, truth tellers were actually tourists whereas liars were primed 
participants. However we argue that this paradigm in itself is completely representative of real life. 
Through this method we attained accurate interviews from innocent people travelling to the Isle of 
Wight for tourism, and from people who were waiting in the terminal with a more sinister intent. An 
undercover interviewer approaching tourists would be aiming to distinguish between these two 
types of people, and our proposed method was effective in doing just that (as demonstrated by the 
consequent lie detection experiment). 
A central requirement of this thesis was to identify cues to deceit that could be readily 
recognised by lay observers, as this would avoid the need to train people specifically to detect 
deception. Unfortunately this does not guarantee that all law enforcement officers will have the 
ability to detect these cues to classify veracity at a rate that can be used in real life. Although in our 
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lie detection study (Experiment 2) people could correctly determine veracity significantly above 
chance level, it was still far from a 100% accuracy rate. Maybe using law enforcement officers as 
participants will increase the rate, however a plethora of research states that they usually perform no 
better than lay observers (e.g. Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2006, Vrij, 2004). 
Another point to consider is that if truth tellers and liars are asked to do different 
activities, the differences that emerge between them may be caused by the different activities they 
do rather than by their veracity condition. But it is questionable to what extent ‘activity’ will elicit 
specific cues. Firstly they do not describe different activities, as liars are asked to use truth tellers' 
stories as their alibi, and cues to veracity are derived from these accounts. Secondly, differences 
between truth tellers and liars can be predicted based on theory, and those theories surpass activities. 
For example, Granhag & Hartwig (2008) demonstrate how liars display the 'avoid and escape' 
strategy to distance themselves from anything they deem to be potentially incriminating. This 
theory was supported by findings in Experiment 1, where liars were more reluctant than truth tellers 
to agree to have their photograph taken. Further support was found in Experiment 3 in which they 
were more reluctant to show their pictures to the mime artist. In addition in Experiment 5, liars were 
less likely than truth tellers to mention the undercover interviewer as a witness, even though it 
formed part of an 'innocent' alibi story. Thus limitations that are steeped solely in the activity itself 
seem refutable. 
A potentially more concerning limitation is that of suspects recognising that the covert 
interviewer is in fact a law enforcement officer. If this were to happen, they may in fact report the 
same events to the undercover interviewer as to a subsequent formal interview. This may not then 
result in the inconsistency observed. It would be fundamental to train covert officers in the art of 
being inconspicuous and ensuring their true intent remains undetected. For example they should be 
able to interact effectively and convincingly with a variety of people in numerous situations, and to 
be vigilant as to cues that may suggest the interviewee is wary of them. Indeed if they are detected, 
protocol would need to be instilled to limit the damage and ensure the suspect does not react in a 
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dangerous manner (such as assaulting the undercover investigator). In these instances the short 
nature of the collective interviews is crucial, as investigators may be required to make a very quick 
decision as to whether the suspect warrants further investigation or not. With regards to recording 
interviews, if the interviewee suspects that the interviewer might be secretly recording and asks 
them outright, the interviewer may be compelled to say no to protect themselves. However in this 
instance the interviewer can legally be held to have ‘induced’ the person to continue, in the belief 
there will be no record of the conversation. British lawyers would be reluctant to agree to the use of 
the material. Arguably of even more concern would be if a suspect realises he is being investigated, 
yet does not reveal this. Whether this realisation affects how the suspect lies may be worth 
researching empirically. 
As with the collective interviewing, we suggest that covert interviewing is adopted more 
widely into police practice in contexts in which it is necessary to determine whether someone has ill 
intentions e.g. counter terrorism initiatives. This will test whether the paradigm is still effective with 
real life forensic punishment stakes at hand. 
 
Future Research 
 
Stakes 
Exploring stakes may shed further light on how collective and undercover interviewing 
can be used in real world settings. In a high stakes collective interviewing situation, liars may 
indeed monitor the interviewer more and each other less, as they focus on their own freedom and 
are less concerned for their partner. Truth tellers may corroborate more, as their anxiety increases 
and they rely further on their partner who can witness their innocence. Whereas throughout the 
thesis support was found for liars 'avoiding and escaping' potential witnesses, truth tellers may 
derive support from witnesses who can support their claims (Nahari, Vrij & Fisher, 2012). 
Alternatively, as with a prisoner's dilemma situation in which participants can either cooperate or 
defect, either truth tellers or liars may decide to focus on proving their own innocence, whilst 
implicating their partner. This warrants further investigation to determine whether the partner adapts 
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an offensive or defensive stance, and how this manifests itself in deceptive cues. 
 
Collective Interviewing 
When answering truthfully or deceptively in an interview, the respondent essentially 
makes a decision with regard to how to influence the interview, the impression they wish to convey 
to the interviewer, and ultimately what they want to be believed to have done. However when doing 
this in a collective interviewing setting, the decision is made on behalf of the group being 
interviewed. This may then differ from when individuals make interview decisions on their own. 
For example in the previously discussed defecting in a prisoner's dilemma situation, individuals will 
most likely make decisions to benefit only themselves, rather than in the interest of the group. 
Decision making in groups is indeed part of collective interviewing and could therefore be 
incorporated into future deception research. A possible starting point to explore is Groupthink - 
when a group makes impaired decisions because group pressures lead to a deterioration of “mental 
efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgement” (Janis, 1972, p. 9). Aspects of Groupthink that 
might be particularly applicable in forensic collective interviewing settings include the illusion of 
invulnerability, which creates excessive optimism that encourages taking extreme risks. Both truth 
tellers and liars in this situation may overestimate the likelihood that they will be believed. In 
addition there may be direct pressure on dissenters, whereby members are under pressure not to 
express arguments against any of the group’s views. Self-censorship could also occur, in which 
doubts and deviations from the perceived group consensus are not expressed. Although in 
Experiment 4b of this thesis, truth tellers were comfortable in correcting each other, interrupting 
each other and adding more information to each other's accounts. It is possible that it will manifest 
in larger groups, and this warrants further investigation. Indeed investigating collective interviewing 
of more than two suspects is needed to assess whether the patterns observed in pair interviews are 
still present. New trends may be identified, as adding a third person to an interview setting (such as 
an interpreter) can have a negative impact on rapport, which then affects how the interview 
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transpires (Driskell, Blickensderfer & Salas, 2013). So if varying the numbers of people present in 
the interview can affect the outcome, law enforcement officers may need to vary their interview 
protocol depending on the number of suspects present e.g. when approaching a suspicious vehicle, 
the number of passengers may determine the manner of questioning employed. 
 
Undercover interviewing 
Whilst we explored various manipulations of undercover and collective interviewing, 
the non verbal behaviour of pairs of suspects when interviewed covertly was not assessed. In terms 
of real life implications this may be of interest in order to provide further cues to ill intentions when 
approaching suspicious groups. For example eye contact patterns such as deliberate eye contact 
from liars may be observed, as they were present in formal collective interviews (seen in 
Experiment 3). Liars also tend to make fewer illustrators (hand and arm movements to supplement 
speech), and fewer hand and finger movements (non-functional movements of hands and fingers 
independent of arm movement) which may be due to either content complexity or attempted control 
(Vrij, 2004). 
It may be worthwhile to control for the length of the undercover interview. Whilst all 
the undercover interviewing techniques employed in the thesis involved short interviews (ten 
questions or less), in real world applications there may only be a few seconds available to determine 
whether an individual or group warrants further investigation. Therefore manipulations can be 
introduced to determine the shortest viable undercover interview that can effectively elicit cues to 
deceit. Some rapidly observable cues to deceit that we identified in interviews are frequent hedges 
and confirmations (as observed in Experiment 1), and a lack of gaze aversion, or more deliberate 
eye contact (as observed in Experiment 4a). These could be observed in interviewees in a short 
interview, perhaps more readily than other more laboured cues (which may require more words) 
such as avoiding mentioning of specific times (as observed in Experiment 1) or avoiding 
mentioning witnesses (as observed in Experiment 5).  
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Undercover interviewing is not always carried out by people who are unknown to the 
suspect(s). For example in espionage work, deep cover agents or moles are sometimes dispatched to 
infiltrate organisations. In these situations there is a great deal of undercover interviewing involved, 
and it is of paramount importance that the agent acquires the necessary information without 
arousing suspicion. In some instances, people who report wrongdoing to the authorities (informants) 
are asked to record conversations with the alleged parties – for example in the case of the 
pharmaceutical company Amgen being accused of illegal marketing tactics (Pollack & Secret, 
2012). These conversations are a form of undercover interviewing, and should be treated as such. 
Therefore research can be conducted to determine the best way to covertly interview suspects that 
are known to the interviewer, without alerting them as to their intentions. This may involve training 
them to integrate information gathering style questions into seemingly mundane conversations, for 
example as our undercover interviewer in Experiment 1 did. On the surface, all that he engaged in 
was an apparently innocuous conversation about the interviewee's plans for their trip. Even if the 
interviewee had known the interviewer, this still may have been a plausible occurrence and not 
raised suspicion. 
 
Conclusions 
This thesis has demonstrated that covert interviewing can successfully elicit cues to 
deception. A key finding pertaining to undercover interviewing is that liars distance themselves 
from witnesses or anything they deem to be potentially incriminating, even if this could form part of 
a plausible cover story. In addition it has shown that collective interviewing of pairs of suspects can 
elicit verbal and non verbal cues to deceit. A further important finding relating to collective 
interviewing is that truth tellers are more prepared than liars to correct each other, interrupt each 
other, and add more information to each other's accounts. Findings were replicated throughout the 
thesis, suggesting robustness and potential usability in real world settings. 
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